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Abstract
This dissertation comprises three essays on the Turkish labor market. The
first essay characterizes the distinctive characteristics of the Turkish labor
market with the aim of understanding the factors lying behind its long-
standing poor performance relative to its European counterparts. The anal-
ysis is based on a cross-country comparison among selected European Union
countries. The study initially examines the role of the economic crises in
explaining the stagnant structure of the Turkish labor market. Observing
that labor market failures persist beyond business cycles, the analysis sug-
gests that institutions can potentially explain the diversity of labor market
performances, especially during downturns.
Among all the indicators of labor market flexibility, non-wage cost rigidi-
ties are regarded as one of the most important factors in slowing down em-
ployment creation in Turkey. The second essay focuses on an employment
subsidy policy which introduces a reduction in non-wage costs through social
security premium incentives granted to women and young men. Exploiting a
difference-in-difference-in differences strategy, I evaluate the effectiveness of
this policy in creating employment for the target group. The results, net of
the recent crisis effect, suggest that the policy accounts for a 1.4% to 1.6%
increase in the probability of being hired for women aged 30 to 34 above men
of the same age group in the periods shortly after the announcement of the
policy.
In the third essay of the dissertation, I analyze the labor supply response
of married women to their husbands’ job losses (AWE). I empirically test
the hypothesis of added worker effect for the global economic crisis of 2008
by relying on the Turkey context. Identification is achieved by exploiting
the exogenous variation in the output of male-dominated sectors hard-hit by
the crisis and the gender-segmentation that characterizes the Turkish labor
market. Findings based on the instrumental variable approach suggest that
the added worker effect explains up to 64% of the observed increase in female
labor force participation in Turkey. The size of the effect depends on how
long it takes for wives to adjust their labor supply to their husbands’ job
losses.
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Chapter 1
What Makes the Turkish Labor Market
Distinctive? A Comparison with the
EU Countries
1.1 Introduction
The Turkish labor market has been performing rather poorly for the last
two decades despite a relatively high economic growth rate. Among its main
features are a downward trend in the labor force participation rate, despite
an increasing working age population, and a low rate of employment partic-
ularly of urban women along with a large share of low skilled labor force and
the great size of unregistered (informal) employment. These facts all place
Turkey among the worst performing labor markets in Europe. What could
be the reasons behind such a poor performance of the Turkish labor market
that leaves it behind its European counterparts despite a higher growth rate?
The previous literature has widely addressed the importance of labor
market institutions, more particularly of labor market flexibility in explaining
the divergent performances of labor markets (Nickell, 1997; OECD, 1994;
Sengenberger, 2006). Labor market flexibility has been suggested to many
countries, including Turkey as a remedy to overcome the bottlenecks in their
labor markets. The flexibility-oriented argument posits the flexible labor
markets of the Anglo-Saxon countries as having better performance than the
more rigid labor markets of Continental Europe (Onaran, 2004; Senses, 1994;
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World Bank, 2006). It is still questionable whether flexibility is as important
in a labor market with characteristics such as Turkey as it is in the richer
but slower growing European countries.
The current global economic crisis, however, makes the critical role at-
tached to the flexibility issue doubtful considering the incapability of the
Anglo-Saxon countries to prevent unemployment rates from upsurging dur-
ing the crisis. That the relatively more rigid German labor market has shown
an outstanding performance during the crisis despite a substantial economic
contraction lends credence to the doubts about the flexibility argument. In
parallel, the institutional setting of the German labor market has recently at-
tracted considerable attention in research (Burda and Hunt, 2011; Lehmann,
2010; Rinne and Zimmermann, 2012). In this respect, this study aims to
discuss what types of institutions have been in place as an adjustment mech-
anism during the crisis and to what extent these institutions can explain the
variation in labor market responses to the crisis. Although no country could
escape from the crisis, the intensity and timing of the crisis and the speed
of recovery substantially vary among countries. As the crisis hit most of the
Europe much harder than Turkey, the relative position of the Turkish la-
bor market has improved, most probably temporarily. This paper, therefore,
discusses the relative performance of the Turkish labor market separately;
before and during the crisis.
There is a relatively large literature on the Turkish labor market present-
ing the developments in main outcomes including employment, unemploy-
ment and wages1; the labor market effects of the economic crises, especially
the domestically oriented crisis in 2001 and much less on the global crisis in
20082; as well as the flexibility issue3. As a contribution to the current liter-
ature, this study intends to tell a more compact and up-to-date story about
the Turkish labor market from an international perspective. It documents
1For further information about the structure of the Turkish labor market, see Bulutay
(1995); Bagdadioglu and Ercan (1999); Ercan and Tunali (1997), Ilkkaracan and Yorukoglu
(2004), Tunali (2003), World Bank (2006).
2For the effects of the 2001 crisis, see Koyuncu and Senses (2004), Senses (1994, 2002),
and as for the 2008 crisis, see Ercan et al. (2010); Memis (2011).
3For the labor market flexibility in Turkey, see Ercan and Tansel (2006), Onaran (2004),
TCEA (2004), Ozyildirim and Togan(1997).
2
how both labor market performances and institutional events have evolved
in recent years. With a special focus on the global economic crisis of 2008,
it characterizes the diversity of labor market responses to the crisis across a
selected group of European countries, and relates the diversities to different
labor market institutions. This study is of particular importance as it lays
the groundwork for forthcoming chapters of the thesis in which more specific
policy topics related to the Turkish labor market are examined.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 presents the main develop-
ments in the labor market outcomes in Turkey in relation to the institutional
events over the last two decades. Section 1.3 documents cross-country dif-
ferences in the impacts of the global economic crisis, and Section 1.4 relates
the labor market responses to the crisis to some labor market institutions.
Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Peculiar Characteristics of the Turkish
Labor Market
This section evaluates the labor market performance of Turkey in comparison
with the European Union (EU) countries considering her candidate member-
ship status. The countries which have similar development level (GDP per
capita) to Turkey are selected for the comparative analysis. These are the
new member states (NMS) including Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania and Slovakia4. They are also in common with some labor
market characteristics such as the sectoral distribution of employment. Fur-
thermore, two old member states, namely Germany and Spain are included
in the comparison group as they are the representatives of the best and worst
performances in the EU-15 during the global crisis.
One should be cautious in assessing the statistical findings since there
could be an inconsistency in data from different sources or from the same
source but at different points in time. To minimize the data inconsistency
4Croatia has not been included in the comparison group as its membership of the EU
has become effective on 1 July 2013.
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problem, international (e.g. Eurostat and OECD) and national (e.g. Turk-
stat) data sources are relied on for cross-country and country-specific evalua-
tions, respectively. While the data used for cross-country analysis date back
to 1995, the earliest date of national data analysis is 1988. This section with
the intent of evaluating the relative performance of the Turkish labor market
focuses on the period up to 2008, and the period after 2008 is analyzed in the
following section while discussing the impacts of the global economic crisis
across the selected countries.
As presented in Table 1.1, Turkey is the only country in the compari-
son group experiencing an approximately 10 percentage-point decline in the
rates of labor force participation and employment between 1995 and 2007.
The comparison countries (except for Romania), on the other hand, saw a
positive growth in these indicators. As of 2007 Turkey has the lowest rates of
participation (49.1%) and employment (44.6%) which are around 20 percent-
age points below the EU average. Figure 1.1 makes clear that the divergence
between Turkey and the comparison countries is mainly because of the dra-
matically low rate of female participation in Turkey at 23.6% in 2007, which
is around one third of the EU average. On the other hand, there is not such a
difference in the male participation rate between Turkey and the comparison
group. A similar pattern is observed for the employment rate across genders
(see Table 1.3).
Many researchers from Turkey point out the significant role of cultural fac-
tors in explaining the lower rate of labor force participation of women relative
to that of men (Aran et al., 2010; Dayioglu and Kirdar, 2009; Gunduz-Hosgor
and Smith, 2006). It is widely argued that the dominance of patriarchal rela-
tions in the society and accordingly the common perception against women
for doing market work brings about a sharp distinction in duties fulfilled by
men and women. While men are regarded as primary bread-winners, women
are considered to be mainly responsible for household chores and child care
activities. The influence of the traditional division of labor in households is
clearly seen in the rates of labor force participation among married people.
While only one out of five married women participate in the labor force, the
participation rate is almost seven percentage points higher for their single
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counterparts. The increasing responsibilities of women related to household
chores after marriage make them, particularly the urban females, withdraw
from the labor market. As reported by Aran et al. (2010), only one fifth of
poorly educated urban women continue working after having the first child.
Although they have a higher educational attainment, the participation rate
of urban women decreases by 15 percentage points upon the first baby’s birth,
and does not reach its earlier level. On the other hand, men who were not
working before the marriage enter the labor force in order to fulfill their roles
as bread winners. This could be the reason for the higher rate of labor force
participation among the married men relative to their single counterparts.5
The rise in educational attainment alleviates the disadvantageous position
of women in the labor market. As Table 1.2 displays, the female labor force
participation rate in 2007 is almost 70% among university graduates, whereas
the rate drops to 20% for those who are educated less than high school level
and below 13% for the same group of women who live in the urban areas.
The male labor force participation rate, however, does not exhibit such a
variation depending on the educational attainment provided they are literate.
An important issue worthy of note is the substantial improvement in the
educational profile of employment over the last two decades. According to the
Turkstat (2013) records, the share of illiterate workers in total employment
decreased from 17.6% in 1988 to 4.8% in 2007, and university graduates have
obtained a larger share in employment with an increase from 4.9% to 18.2%
between 1988 and 2007. Nevertheless, the largest proportion of employment
is still held by workers with less than high school education (51.5%). Turkey
is one of the few OECD countries where the number of individuals with less
than secondary education available to the labor market increased between
1998 and 2008 (OECD, 2010). This points to one of the main problems of
the Turkish labor market that the bulk of low educated and low skilled labor
force is still dominant in the labor market.
On the other hand, higher educational attainment does not prevent young
5The descriptive statistics concerning the difference in labor supply behaviors of married
people are not presented here in order to avoid replication as it is discussed in the third
chapter of the thesis.
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people from the hazard of becoming unemployed. University graduates aged
20-24 have a staggering unemployment rate of 25.2% in 2007, compared to a
5.9% rate for those aged 25-64 and a 9.7% rate for university graduates over-
all (Turkstat, 2013). This implies that there is a high probability for a young
person to become unemployed just after graduation from university. The un-
employment rate in Turkey is the highest for the age group 15-24, that is 20%
in 2007, and decreases proportionately for those above 25 years-old (ibid). As
Table 1.5 displays, the young suffer from the unemployment problem more
severely than the other age groups in all the comparison countries.
The large share of low educated people in the labor market along with the
limited capacity of the formal sector to absorb the excess supply produces
an informalization problem that is another worrisome issue for the Turkish
labor market. Informal employment, defined as not being registered with
any social security institution, constitutes 45.4% of total employment which
amounts to 9.4 million employed people as of 2007 (see Table 1.3). One might
interpret the large size of the informal sector as a silent consensus between
employers and the government given that unemployment would have been
a much more dramatic problem in the absence of an informal sector, more
particularly in the urban area.
The informalization problem in the urban area is mainly an outcome of
the sectoral transition process through which Turkey has been passing over
the last two decades. This process points out a marked decline in agricultural
employment due to mechanization and removal of the subsidies in the sector
associated with a rural exodus. While agriculture was the largest employing
sector in 1988, accounting for 46.5% of total employment, its share decreased
to 23.7% in 2007, amounting to a 3.4 million employment loss. The fall in
agricultural employment was replaced by the services sector which produced
a growth in employment of around 5 million in the same period (Turkstat,
2013). Despite the marked decline in agricultural employment in Turkey, it is
still more than five times the EU-15 average and four times the EU-27 average
(see Table 1.4). Turkey, following Romania, ranks the highest in terms of
agricultural employment share while the incidence of services employment is
the lowest as of 2007. The productivity in the agricultural sector is, however,
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substantially low relative to the other sectors as can be seen in the figures
of gross value added in Table 1.4. This contributes to the low-skill profile of
the labor force in Turkey.
There is a remarkable decline in agricultural employment also in the NMS
along with a proportional increase in services employment. A comparison
with the EU-15 countries shows that while the incidence of agricultural em-
ployment in the NMS is relatively higher (but comparable in Estonia and
Slovakia), the incidence of services employment is roughly comparable, ex-
cept for Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. This implies that these
four countries are still in the early stages of a structural transition process,
and so is Turkey.
The dissolution of agriculture in Turkey was triggered by an institutional
change in 2000 called “Agricultural Reform Implementation Program”6. The
program basically replaced price supports on agricultural products and input
subsidies with direct income support for farmers dependent on the size of
cultivated area. In addition to a change in support composition, the amount
of governmental support was reduced (Cakmak and Dudu, 2010; World Bank,
2004). Whether the decline in the share of agricultural employment after 2000
is due to this institutional change is hard to say without exploring the causal
effect; it is clear, though, that this institutional change gave an impetus to
the process of structural change which is in line with the downward trend
in the incidence of agricultural employment versus the upward trend in the
services.
As a result of this sectoral transition process, plenty of the low-skilled
labor force dropping out of agriculture have migrated towards cities with
the hope of finding a job. The urban economy is rather selective and re-
quires higher qualifications in contrast to agricultural activities where half
of the employment is composed of unpaid family workers, the majority of
whom are female (78.3%). Women coming out of agriculture are less likely
to upgrade their skills and to acquire skill-required jobs relative to their male
6This program was regulated under an agreement signed with the World Bank which
was grounded on the IMF standby agreement in 1999 and the letters of intent dated 9
December 1999 and 10 March 2000 (Gunaydin, 2009).
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counterparts given their responsibilities related to housework and child care.
Therefore, women have been much more adversely affected by this transition
process (Bulutay, 1995; Ozyildirim and Togan, 1997). Women with lower ed-
ucational attainment generally quit job searching because they do not have
any hope of finding a job with their present qualifications. The fact known
as “discouraged worker effect” may clearly be seen in the labor force partici-
pation rate of women in the urban area, which is approximately 4 percentage
points less than the overall female participation rate (see Table 1.2).
It is also important to consider the role of business cycles while discussing
the poor performance of a labor market, most particularly in a country like
Turkey where economic crises occur so frequently. As illustrated in Figure
1.2, Turkey’s economy exhibits an unstable growth trend including expan-
sionary and recessionary episodes throughout the 1990s7. The slumps in the
GDP growth rate observed in 1999 and 2009 correspond to the Russian fi-
nancial crisis of 1998 and the current global economic crisis, respectively.
While the latter will be discussed in the following section, the former one is
not covered in this study as there is no discernible effect of that crisis on the
Turkish labor market. On the other hand, the other two points in time in
which an outcome fall is recorded, namely 1994 and 2001, refer to the do-
mestically originated economic crises8. The 2001 crisis hit the labor market
particularly hard compared to the crisis in 1994, despite similar levels of out-
put losses. The employment rate with a 5 percentage-point decline between
2000 and 2002 fell to 41.7%. In parallel, the unemployment rate showed a
marked increase from 6.5% in 2000 to 10.3% in 2002, and remained above
10% since then despite a rapid recovery in output, that was on average 6.8%
growth in GDP between 2002 and 2007. The crisis negatively impacted the
7The factors behind this precarious performance are mainly associated with the radical
change in the economic policy arena in the 1980s; namely a shift from import substitu-
tion to export orientation. This economic transition accompanied structural adjustment
reforms, one of which was the liberalization of capital movements in 1989. Henceforth
the growth performance of the country became dependent on unstable capital movements
(Senses, 2002).
8These crises erupted due to rapid outflow of foreign capital and initially spread
throughout the financial market and then influenced the rest of the economy including
the real sector. The basic outcomes of these crises might be summarized as economic
contraction, galloping inflation as well as a rise in unemployment and wage reductions.
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non-agricultural area even more, where the unemployment rate jumped from
9.3% in 2000 to 16% in 2002.
The downward rigidity of the unemployment rate over the last decade
irrespective of economic growth has introduced a new phenomenon to Turkey
called “jobless growth”9. In fact, the NMS in the comparison group also
suffered from jobless growth before 2004, albeit for different reasons. After
2004, however, output and employment growth went hand in hand (Lehman,
2010)10. The rise in the employment rate in the NMS by 2004 improved
the relative position of the countries against Turkey. With the outburst of
the current economic crisis, their relative positions have deteriorated. The
discussion now turns to the evaluation of the impacts of the recent crisis on
the selected labor markets.
1.3 Labor Market Responses to the Global
Economic Crisis
Recently Turkey has been passing through another crisis era which originated
in the United States (U.S.) financial markets. The U.S. financial crisis that
rapidly spread into a global economic crisis has had a devastating effect on
incomes, government finances, and not the least, labor markets. With the
outburst of the crisis in Europe, the employment rate fell by on average
two percentage points in the EU-27 between the first quarters of 2008 and
2010 along with a proportional increase in the unemployment rate (Eurostat,
9The term “jobless growth” was first introduced by the International Labor Orga-
nization (ILO) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
to represent the evidence of economic growth not translating into employment creation
in many countries (ILO, 2006; UNCTAD, 2006). Although there were previously some
other periods in Turkey where un/employment was not elastic to output growth, this
phenomenon has lately been pronounced for Turkey.
10Lehman (2010) with reference to Rutrowski (2007) tells the story of jobless growth
in the NMS in relation to the restructuring process of the economies. After the central
planning period lasting until the mid 1990s, firms started to eliminate labor hoarding and
restructure their production processes to be more competitive in world markets. At the
end of this process, there occurred a rise in their employment rates thanks to the upturn
in the world economy associated with their accession to the EU. See Figure 1.3 for the
trend in the rates of employment, unemployment and output growth in the NMS.
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2013).
Interestingly Turkey has experienced an increase in the employment rate
over the crisis. As Table 1.3 displays, the increase in the employment rate
is entirely attributable to the improvement in female employment outcomes
which is elaborated in the third chapter of the dissertation. Furthermore,
this increase has taken place in the formal sector. With a simple algebra
based on Table 1.3, we can calculate the in/formal employment rate (as a
share of working age population) which reveals the source of the employ-
ment increase. In particular, the product of the share of formal employment
in total employment and the overall employment rate yields us the formal
employment rate, which rose to 27.7% in 2012 from 22.7% in 2007. On the
other hand, the informal employment rate decreased from 18.8% in 2007 to
17.7% in 2012. This implies that it is the informal sector that bore the bur-
den of the crisis. It is needless to say that the share of informal employment
in total employment decreased accordingly over the period, as presented in
Table 1.3.
Despite an improvement in the employment rate, the unemployment rate
recorded an increase due to the crisis. Table 1.5 indicates that the unem-
ployment rate rose to 12.5% in 2009 from 8.8% in 2007 and then decreased
to 10.7% in 2010 with the recovery from the crisis. The non-agricultural
unemployment rate, showing a parallel but more severe trend, jumped to
17.4% in 2009 with a 5 percentage-point increase, as shown in Table 1.3. A
relatively moderate rise in the unemployment rate categorizes Turkey as a
medium level-affected country alongside Bulgaria and Slovakia. As the cri-
sis hit most of the EU countries much more severely, Turkey’s ranking has
become better than the period prior to the crisis. In the current situation,
the unemployment rate in Turkey is lower than that in one third of the EU
countries. However, it was the highest in 2007 following Slovakia (11.2%)
and Poland (9.6%).
Spain and the Baltic countries saw the highest employment losses dur-
ing the crisis. More concretely, the unemployment rate more than doubled
in Spain and more than tripled in the NMS including Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania between 2007 and 2010. Spain with an unemployment rate of 25%
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in 2012 currently ranks the highest among the EU-27. Poland and Romania,
on the other hand, are the countries with the lowest increases in unemploy-
ment rates of less than 3 percentage points since the crisis burst into sight.
Germany is the only country where the unemployment rate did not increase,
even decreased by a 3 percentage points over the period (see Table 1.5).
Not only the severity of the crisis but also the timing of the outburst and
the speed of the recovery vary across countries. In Europe, the crisis first hit
labor markets such as the United Kingdom and Ireland where the financial
sector has a relatively high share of employment. Among the comparison
countries, however, Spain is the first one to experience an unemployment
increase by the third quarter of 2007 (Eurostat, 2013). Spain was followed by
Latvia and Lithuania in the first quarter of 2008, and Estonia and Turkey in
the third quarter of 2008. Turkey, despite its late reaction to the crisis, is the
earliest to start to recover by the third quarter of 2009. Even the employment
rate in Turkey outstripped its pre-crisis level by the first quarter of 2010.
Following Turkey, Estonia started to see an upward trend in employment
rate by the second quarter of 2010. Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia are the
others having very recently begun to recover; whereas the rest have still been
suffering from unemployment increases even in 2012 (see Table 1.5).
The adverse effects of the crisis are not evenly distributed over the pop-
ulation within a country. In particular, youth unemployment (of the age
group less than 25 years old) has increased at a faster pace than for all other
age groups. Table 1.5 indicates that the average unemployment rate in the
EU-27 was 7.1% in 2007 and rose to 10.6% in 2012, while the youth unem-
ployment rate reached 22.3% in 2012 with a seven-percentage point increase
from 2007. The highest jump was observed in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
where youth unemployment rate more than tripled. Currently the incidence
of youth unemployment is at least double the total rate of unemployment
in all member states with the notable exception of Germany. Turkey, with
a youth unemployment rate of 15.7% in 2012, ranks the lowest among the
selected countries following Germany.
Considering gender differentiation, the economic crisis has generally af-
fected men more than women given that traditionally male-dominated sectors
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(e.g. manufacturing and construction) were particularly hard hit, especially
in the first phase of the crisis (Leschke and Watt, 2010; Ercan et al., 2010).
In all comparison countries experiencing a rise in unemployment during the
crisis, except for Poland and Romania, the increase in unemployment rate
is due to a higher growth of male rather than female unemployment, as in-
spection of Figure 1.4 makes clear. As a result, the unemployment rate is
currently slightly higher among men than among women in a large number
of the EU countries in contrast to the situation before the crisis. Turkey ex-
hibits an exceptional case. Women in Turkey have had higher unemployment
rates than their male counterparts in the periods both before and after the
crisis; however, the gender gap against women has narrowed between 2007
and 2009. After the economic recovery has started, by the end of 2009, male
unemployment rate has declined much faster, and the gender gap in 2010 has
become even wider than it was in 2007.
Moreover, people with low educational attainment have been more ad-
versely affected. The average unemployment rate in the EU-27 among those
educated at no higher than secondary level was 10.9% in 2007, and jumped
to 16.2% in 2010, whereas the unemployment rate among those educated at
the upper secondary school level increased only by 2.1 percentage points in
the same period. The university graduates saw even less increase in unem-
ployment, around 1.4 percentage points. The situation is somewhat different
in Turkey in the sense that those with low and medium levels of education
saw the same rise in unemployment of around 4.1 percentage points. Never-
theless, the least affected group is the university graduates as can be figured
out in Figure 1.5.
Nonstandard employment has played a significant role during the cri-
sis as it provides more freedom for employers in controlling the size of the
workforce according to the firms’ needs so as to respond to demand changes
more quickly (Monastiriotis, 2003). As Table 1.6 displays, part-time employ-
ment has increased during the crisis in all comparison countries but Poland.
The largest growth in part-time employment took place in countries such as
Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia with relatively low initial levels of part-time
employment, fluctuating less than 10%. In contrast to the upward trend in
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part-time employment during the crisis, the incidence of temporary employ-
ment such as fixed-term and temporary agency workers decreased, especially
in the initial phase of the crisis. This immediate decline could have been
caused by less job security of temporary workers relative to their perma-
nent counterparts, making them more likely to be the first to lose their jobs
(Leschke and Watt, 2010). However, by mid-2009 temporary employment
has increased in a number of countries, possibly because employers preferred
short-time contracts during the crisis which can easily be terminated (ibid).
Spain with a decrease of 7 percentage points in the share of temporary em-
ployment between 2007 and 2010 has largely utilized nonstandard employ-
ment in adjusting the labor force to output losses given the rigid rules on
dismissal of permanent workers. This is consistent with the huge increase
(of 23.4 percentage points) in the unemployment rate among the young who
are likely to hold temporary contracts. On the other hand, nonstandard em-
ployment is not common in Turkey similar to the NMS, and neither exhibits
a considerable fluctuation during the crisis.
What could be the reasons behind the divergences in labor market re-
sponses during the crisis? As shown in Figure 1.3, all the selected countries
but Poland have suffered from a decline in output during the crisis; how-
ever, the labor markets have not responded to output losses proportionally.
The NMS saw large output losses, which are combined with large declines
in employment and a substantial hike in unemployment. Spain despite its
below average output loss exhibited a large labor market contraction. Ger-
many, on the other hand, exhibited almost stable rates of employment and
unemployment despite a considerable output loss. Many researchers point at
labor market institutions in explaining the divergent performances of labor
markets even among similar economies (Burda and Hunt, 2011; Rinne and
Zimmermann, 2012). In the next section these institutions are elaborated
with a question in mind: to what extent could labor market institutions
explain the diversity in labor market responses to the crisis?
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1.4 The Role of Labor Market Institutions
During the Global Economic Crisis
Since the 1990s, labor market institutions, particularly of labor market flexi-
bility have been central to the literature examining the reasons behind the di-
vergence in labor market performances, in an attempt to establish a causal re-
lation between labor market performances and institutional structures (Eich-
horst et al., 2010). The current crisis makes this topic more interesting given
the fact that labor market institutions might be responsible for the diversi-
ties in labor market responses to the economic downturn even among similar
economies. This section will focus on institutions related to labor market
flexibility having actively played a role in alleviating the effects of the crisis.
Labor market flexibility is commonly defined as the degree and speed
of adjustment of labor markets to changes in economic conditions. Accord-
ing to this narrow definition, labor market flexibility is a part of employers’
strategies within the aim of cost reduction or productivity increase (Brod-
sky, 1994; Monastiriotis, 2003; Ozaki, 1999). A broader definition of labor
market flexibility also comprises the ability of workers to adapt themselves
to new economic conditions, especially through upgrading their skills as well
as to adjust their working lives and working hours to their own preferences,
especially through the use of working time flexibility (Chung, 2006; Jepsen
and Klammer, 2004). This broad definition involves five types of flexibility
according to a widely used classification developed by Atkinson (1984):
1. External numerical flexibility : Firms’ ability to adjust the number
of employees to the changes in economic conditions, e.g. employment
protection legislation.
2. Internal numerical flexibility : Firms’ ability to adjust working hours of
employees already employed by the firm, e.g. working time reductions,
short-time work schemes.
3. External functional flexibility : Employees’ ability to adapt themselves
to structural changes through upgrading their skills, e.g. active labor
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market policies.
4. Internal functional flexibility : Firms’ ability in adjusting to demand
changes through a flexible work organization, e.g. multi-skilling, task
rotation and team working
5. Labor cost flexibility is composed of two components. The first is wage
cost flexibility which refers to the responsiveness of real wages to chang-
ing economic conditions. This is related to wage-setting mechanisms
such as collective bargaining agreements. The second is non-wage cost
flexibility which refers to the adjustability of labor cost that is not di-
rectly related to actual working hours, including income tax on wages,
employers’ and employees’ contributions to the social security and un-
employment insurance fund (Monastiriotis, 2003).
In this analysis wage cost flexibility will be excluded from the discussion
since it requires a comprehensive and a separate analysis including the influ-
ence of productivity, inflation lags in the collective bargaining and so forth.
Neither will non-wage cost flexibility be discussed as it is evaluated in the
second chapter of the thesis. Considering their key roles during the recent
crisis in accommodating adverse shocks, the focus will rather be on four types
of institutions which are employment protection legislation, flexible working
time arrangements, active labor market policies and unemployment insurance
benefits.
1.4.1 Employment Protection Legislation
External numerical flexibility, defined as the adjustability of the size of em-
ployment, is roughly achieved by removing regulations on job security, easing
dismissal rules and extending use of nonstandard employment. The main de-
terminant of external numerical flexibility is employment protection legisla-
tion (EPL) that regulates the initiation and termination of the employment
relationship by setting hiring and firing rules which make the labor force
more costly to the employer.
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A widely used indicator measuring the strictness of EPL has been devel-
oped by the OECD (OECD, 2004). The so-called “EPL index” is composed of
three separate indices; (i) hiring and firing rules for permanent workers, (ii)
regulations on nonstandard employment contracts such as part-time, fixed-
term and temporary employment, (iii) regulations on collective dismissals.
The index runs potentially from 0 to 6, where a larger number implies more
rigidity and thus a higher labor cost to employers. There is a considerable
variation in the level of stringency of EPL among the EU countries as well as
across the types of EPL. Turkey with an index of 3.5 is overall the strictest
country, and many NMS are more flexible than Germany and Spain (OECD,
2013). A comparison of the permanent component of the index makes the
differences among countries less marked. As Figure 1.6 displays11, the in-
dices in the comparison group fluctuate around the OECD average, except
for Germany and Latvia which are the strictest countries, and Estonia which
is the most flexible. Regarding the requirements for collective dismissal, the
selected countries are generally above the OECD average. Germany and
Spain with an index of 3.8 rank the highest, Turkey with relatively lenient
requirements ranks in the middle, and Estonia and Poland scaling at the
OECD average are the most flexible countries in the comparison group.
Much of the cross-country variation in the EPL index is due to the dif-
ferences in the level of regulations on nonstandard employment contracts,
particularly because temporary employment is much less regulated in the
NMS than in the old member states (Lehman, 2010). Correspondingly, the
EPL indices in the NMS are quite low whilst the index is by far the highest
in Turkey, followed by Spain (see Figure 1.6). Turkey has recently regulated
many types of flexible work arrangements which have not a widespread us-
age yet, as can be seen in Table 1.6 (Law No. 4857, 2003). It is still the
only country in the OECD which has not legally introduced temporary work
agencies. This could be the reason why Turkey is the most rigid country in
terms of the temporary component of the EPL index (World Bank, 2006).
One should be cautious in evaluating the strictness of the Turkish labor
11Figure 1.6, relying on the EPL index developed by the OECD, does not include non-
OECD member EU countries such as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania.
16
market given the large size of the informal sector (45.4% as of 2007), which
makes the market overall much more flexible than what is recorded (Ercan
et al., 2010). In consistency with this argument, despite no considerable
change in the share of temporary employment during the crisis (as displayed
in Table 1.6), a remarkable decline was observed in informal employment (as
displayed in Table 1.3) which is mostly composed of vulnerable groups and
more likely to be temporarily employed without a legal contract.
Statistical evidence shows that countries with stronger EPL, like Ger-
many, have suffered fewer employment losses than those with weak EPL such
as Anglo-Saxon countries. On the other hand, Spain which is also an exam-
ple of a strict EPL-country experienced a vast number of job losses during
the crisis. These contradictory cases suggest an ambiguous relation between
EPL and labor market outcomes. The design of EPL as well as the interac-
tion with other labor market institutions could be relevant in explaining the
diversity of the outcomes. Rovelli and Bruno (2008), for instance, document
an ambiguous and non-monotonous relation between EPL and employment
rate, however, the correlation becomes negative for countries with more gen-
erous labor market policies. It seems that the issue is more complicated than
simply being a question of more or less strict EPL. Nevertheless, the rigidity
of regulations could have explanatory power for the variation of labor market
performances especially in the event of an adverse demand shock.
1.4.2 Working-time Flexibility
Working-time flexibility, also known as internal numerical flexibility, has at-
tracted considerable attention during the current crisis. In particular, all the
countries in the comparison group have experienced marked falls in average
weekly working hours per worker with the onset of the crisis (see Table 1.8).
In line with this change, the share of part-time employment in total employ-
ment has increased during the crisis (see Table 1.6). What is more worthy
of attention about working-time flexibility is “short-time working (STW)”
schemes that had a significant impact on preserving jobs during the crisis,
with the largest effect in Germany. STW programs are designed as short-term
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public support provided for employers under unavoidable financial difficulties
due to external demand shocks so as to refrain from layoffs through reducing
working hours, while also providing income-support for workers whose work-
ing hours are reduced due to a shortened workweek or temporary lay-offs
(Burda and Hunt, 2011; Hijzen and Venn, 2011).
Many EU countries as well as Turkey have shown a strong interest in STW
during the crisis. Twenty-two EU countries reported either setting up new
measures or adjusting existing measures in response to the economic down-
turn (European Commission, 2010). The glaring case is the German system
(Kurzarbeit) which has undergone many modifications during the crisis. In
particular, the eligibility requirements of the STW scheme were changed to
facilitate the access to subsidies by a broader group of workers (including
fixed term and temporary agency workers), to reduce the required minimum
number of affected workers, to extend the maximum duration (which was 6
months before the crisis) to 24 months and to increase the level of compen-
sation (Burda and Hunt, 2011). These modifications were embodied in large
increases in the number of beneficiaries. To illustrate, the average number
of beneficiaries in 2009 was recorded at more than one million, which is ten
times the 2008 average (Leshke and Watt, 2010).
In Germany, as in many old member states, employees do not need to
fulfill any specific requirement to be eligible for STW benefits and can have
access to the scheme simply because they rely on an employment contract
linking them to their employer (European Commission, 2010). On the other
hand, in Spain, support for STW is provided for those who fulfill the eligi-
bility requirements of unemployment insurance. As indicated in Table 1.7,
almost no change was made in the existing scheme in Spain during the crisis
to facilitate the access to the subsidies. As a result, the STW scheme in
Spain was not utilized effectively during the crisis.
Most of the NMS including Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slo-
vakia, where such schemes did not exist before the crisis, have recently intro-
duced STW schemes. Estonia, the only exemption in this sample, still has no
scheme. Table 1.7 displays that the compensation and maximum duration
of the schemes substantially vary among the NMS. The schemes generally
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cover all types of employment contracts and have a clear link with training
provisions in common. More specifically, there are financial incentives for
both employers and employees associated with undertaking training during
the STW period, however, the actual take-up is recorded as fairly low since
taking part in training is made optional. The STW schemes in the NMS
were, overall, not as efficient as in Germany. While the coverage of STW
schemes in 2009 was 0.1% in Poland, 0.4% in Bulgaria and 1.6% in Slovakia,
it was approximately 3% in Germany (Leshke and Watt, 2010).
Although STW was legislated in Turkey relatively early, in 2003, the
scheme was not utilized effectively until the onset of the current crisis given
the rigidity in eligibility requirements. STW in Turkey is a unilateral deci-
sion taken by employers which requires an approval of the related Ministry.
Workers are paid by the unemployment insurance fund for the period they are
temporarily out of employment. The eligibility of the STW support is depen-
dent on workers’ qualifications concerning the service duration and number
of premium days of the unemployment insurance. The level of compensation
is set to the amount of unemployment benefits which is 40% of the daily
earning of the corresponding worker and cannot exceed 80% of the minimum
wage (Law No. 4857, 2003). During the crisis, some new provisions have
been introduced only for the period between 2008 and 2010. According to
these provisions, STW compensation has been raised by 50%, and the maxi-
mum duration of the STW scheme which was 3 months before the crisis has
been extended to 6 months (Law No. 5763, 2008; Directive, 2009).
With the modifications of the STW scheme in Turkey, the number of
beneficiary employees increased from 650 in 2008 to over 190,000 in 2009,
and the number of beneficiary firms rose from 181 to 3,250 over the same
period12. In parallel to the economic recovery from the crisis, as of 2010 the
number of workers and firms benefiting from the scheme fell to 27,000 and
266, respectively (ISKUR, 2010). The number of beneficiaries, despite the
remarkable increase during the crisis, is still well below the Germany average.
Even if an empirical analysis is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of the
12According to the calculations of Kostekli (2011), saving 190,000 jobs corresponds to
the prevention of an additional 0.8 percent increase in the unemployment rate in 2009.
19
STW schemes, the figures roughly show that Germany has been by far the
most successful implementation area of the STW scheme in comparison to
the rest of Europe.
1.4.3 Active Labor Market Policies
Another labor market measure widely in place during the crisis is active la-
bor market policies (ALMP) which intend to avoid unemployment increases
given the existing scale of job losses. These policies mainly aim at enhancing
labor supply through training activities, increasing labor demand through
public works, wage and employment subsidies, and improving functioning of
the labor market through employment services (Betcherman et. al., 2004).
Whether ALMP are efficient in struggling against the unemployment problem
is still an open question given the ambiguity in the findings of the previous
studies13. In this subsection, it is not the intention to evaluate the effective-
ness of ALMP, but to understand whether policy generosity may be related
to more favorable labor market outcomes, especially during the current crisis.
While the old member states have a long and extensive experience with
ALMP, many NMS have recently introduced these programs in response to
a growing number of unemployment problems. The participation to ALMP
greatly varies by type of programs across countries. As Table 1.9 shows,
while most of the participation takes place in training activities in Germany,
employment incentives constitute the major body of ALMP in Spain and
incentives for direct job creation and starting-up a job are the main mea-
sures in the NMS. The expenditures on ALMP vary by type of programs
accordingly, as displayed in Table 1.10.
Also the policy generosity varies across countries. Figure 1.7 demon-
strates that expenditures on ALMP as a share of GDP range from 0.05% in
Estonia to 0.73% in Germany in 2007. An inspection of Figure 1.7 alongside
Table 1.1 makes clear that there is not a clear-cut relation between the pol-
icy generosity and employment outcomes. The least and the most generous
13For a detailed summary of the related literature, see Betcherman et al. (2004), Lehman
and Kluve (2008) and Card et al. (2009).
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countries, Estonia and Germany, for instance, had very similar employment
rates in 2007. Likewise, policy generosity does not vary in direct proportion
to unemployment rates. The most prominent increase in the share of active
measures was seen in Poland, followed by Germany, which are the two coun-
tries having not been affected by the crisis in terms of employment losses. On
the other hand, the spending on ALMP is substantially lower in the NMS
where unemployment rates are often higher than the old member states.
Even after the unemployment rates upsurged due to the crisis, only a few
countries among the NMS increased spending on active measures, and the
increase remained quite modest relative to the changes in the unemployment
rates. In parallel, the countries which experienced unemployment increases
during the crisis (except for Estonia and Latvia) recorded a bare increase or
even sometimes a decrease in the number of ALMP participants, as can be
seen in Figure 1.8.
One explanation for the modest increase in spending on active measures
during the crisis could be the fiscal problems of the transition economies,
and accordingly limited funds for labor market policies (Lehman and Kluve,
2009). Another explanation could be the priority of policy makers between
passive and active measures. Since they are both financed from the same
pot in most of the countries, when unemployment increases sharply during
recessionary periods, expenditures on passive labor market policies (including
unemployment insurance benefits) substantially increase at the expense of
crowding out active measures (Leschke and Watt, 2010). Consistent with this
argument, active spending saw a moderate increase during the current crisis
relative to the substantial increases in the expenditure rate of unemployment
benefits. As shown in Figure 1.7, in all the countries in the comparison
group, the spending on passive policies has increased much more than the
spending on active measures with the notable exceptions of Germany and
Poland. Nevertheless, a higher proportion of total spending is still on passive
measures in Germany. Poland, however, in every respect is an exceptional
case in that active spending has increased during the crisis despite a decrease
in the share of expenditures on passive measures.
Turkey is not included in the preceding tables and graphs given the lack of
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data according to the EU classification of labor market programs. Compared
to the overall Europe, Turkey has a very limited experience and capacity in
the area of ALMP. The most significant initiative regarding the ALMP is the
establishment of the national employment agency (ISKUR) in 2000. ISKUR’s
responsibilities include both the tasks related to ALMP such as matching be-
tween job seekers and vacancies, providing employment services and training,
regulating private employment agencies, improving employment prospects for
the disabled and ex-convicts as well as some tasks related to passive labor
market policies such as administering the unemployment insurance scheme
(ISKUR, 2010).
Considering the size of unemployment in Turkey (10.3% of unemploy-
ment rate in 2007, amounting to around 2.5 million unemployed), the num-
ber of beneficiaries from ALMP remains quite limited (111,000 placements
and 23,000 trainees in 2007). With an upsurge in the unemployment rate
during the current crisis, the number of beneficiaries increased approximately
ten times as presented in Table 1.11. However, the number of participants
covered by training programs is still quite modest compared to one million
people who became unemployed over the crisis. Taken together, it could be
argued that ALMP have not played an efficient role during the crisis either
in Turkey or in the NMS, nor are these programs institutionalized enough to
avoid unemployment increases in the event of an economic downturn or to
fulfill the other objectives.
1.4.4 Unemployment Insurance Benefits
The main objective of the unemployment insurance benefits (UIB) scheme is
to reduce the cost of unemployment by compensating the financial loss of the
individuals who become unemployed involuntarily due to causes not stem-
ming from themselves. This compensation mechanism intends to encourage
the unemployed to engage in longer job searches. The decision on the opti-
mum level and duration of unemployment benefits is crucial given that the
high level and long duration of benefits could make people reluctant to search
for a job. In order not to fall into the so-called “unemployment trap”, a way
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commonly followed by policy makers is to introduce an incremental reduction
in the amount of benefits (Gruber, 2004). As Table 1.12 presents, the initial
level of payments in the comparison group fluctuates between 50% and 70%
of the earning base, and reduces incrementally throughout the entitlement
period in some countries including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Spain.
Turkey, with a replacement rate set at a maximum 50% of the average daily
wage calculated on the basis of the net wages earned during the last four
months before becoming unemployed, ranks among the lowest.
UIB schemes have been introduced to the NMS after 1990s, mostly in the
second half of the decade. Likewise, the UIB scheme in Turkey was legis-
lated in 1999, and the first payments were made in 2002. The Social Security
Institution is the only responsible body for collecting the premiums and the
remainder of the activities are carried out by ISKUR. The UIB scheme covers
all workers who are registered to the Social Security Institution, apart from
civil servants and the self employed. The scheme is funded by the contri-
butions of workers (of 1%), employers (of 2%) and the government (of 1%),
calculated based on the worker’s monthly gross earning basic to premium
(Law No. 4447, 1999). As in the case of comparison countries, contribution
to the insurance fund is compulsory for each sector.
There is a considerable variation in the duration of UIB across the com-
parison group, ranging from 6 months in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia to
2 years in Spain, as presented in Table 1.12. The duration of payments
generally depends on the length of service and accordingly the accumulated
premiums, as it does in Turkey. Workers who have held continuous employ-
ment for at least 120 days before becoming unemployed and for at least 600
days in the last 3 years are qualified to receive benefits. If this requirement
is met, workers can receive benefits for 6, 8 or 10 months depending on accu-
mulated premiums (Law No. 4447, 1999)14. The contribution requirement,
namely the minimum number of days required for contribution in one year
is 200 days in Turkey, which is substantially high relative to the comparison
14Workers who have paid premiums for 600 days in the previous 3 years receive benefits
for 6 months; those who have paid premiums for 900 days in the previous 3 years receive
benefits for 8 months and those who have paid premiums for 1080 days in the previous 3
years receive benefits for 10 months (Law No. 4447, 1999).
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group, except for Bulgaria and Poland where insurance installments have to
be paid more than 7 months in a year. In addition to these numerical condi-
tions, an unemployed person in Turkey must be involuntarily separated from
her/his job and actively seek a job in order to be eligible for UIB. Similarly,
in all the comparison group but Lithuania and Slovakia, involuntary separa-
tion is required for becoming eligible. However, in none of the comparison
countries, except for Estonia and Romania, do the unemployed lose their
entitlement because they do not actively seek work or they are not available
for job (Venn, 2012).
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the majority of spending on
labor market policies belongs to passive measures including UIB, which in-
creased remarkably during the current crisis in all countries where there is
an upsurge in unemployment rate. The number of beneficiaries also saw a
noticeable increase in these countries, as shown in Figure 1.8. Nonetheless,
the usage of the UIB schemes has remained quite limited in the NMS con-
sidering the huge jump in unemployment rate during the crisis. As noted
by Eichhorst et al. (2010), the stringency of the eligibility criteria might
be responsible for the low access to the schemes. The situation is similar
in Turkey. As Figure 1.9 depicts, the number of UIB applicants in Turkey
which started to rise by the third quarter of 2008, when the unemployment
rate saw a jump due to the crisis, peaked in April 2009 and began to decline
thanks to the economic recovery. More concretely, the number of beneficia-
ries increased from 120,000 in June 2008 to 320,000 in April 2009. Despite
such an increase, the efficiency of the scheme is still regarded as quite mod-
est given the 1.3 million-increase in the number of unemployed in the same
period.
Given the under-utilization of the unemployment insurance fund due to
the stringency in the eligibility requirements, a large amount of surplus
amounting to 61 billion Turkish Liras (almost 25 billion Euros) has been
accumulated in the fund by the end of 2012 (ISKUR, 2013). This surplus
has been used in some employment supporting activities. A recent one, in-
troduced in May 2008, aims to decrease hiring cost of employers. The fund
was allocated to pay out the share of employers’ social security contributions
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during a five-year period. The evaluation of the effectiveness of this regu-
lation in creating employment constitutes the main interest of the second
chapter of the thesis.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has documented the poor performance of the Turkish labor mar-
ket despite a higher economic growth rate relative to its European counter-
parts, and relates the labor market failures to the economic crises with a
special focus on the recent global crisis. Furthermore, it has characterized
the labor market institutions which have actively played a role during the
current crisis in order to help our understanding of the diversity of labor
market performances across the selected EU countries. It is important to
notice however that a formal modeling and testing of the possible causal
nexus between institutions and outcomes is well beyond the purpose of this
chapter. It will, instead, be the specific object of the next two chapters of
the dissertation.
Being aware of the necessity of an econometric analysis to provide conclu-
sive results, the findings acquired throughout the paper can be summarized
as follows. First, the problems Turkey has been facing in the labor market
seem to be far beyond being explained by economic downturns. The recent
experience with the current economic crisis has shown that labor market flex-
ibility, which has often been recommended to many countries as well as to
Turkey to overcome the bottlenecks in the labor market, does not necessarily
bring about a successful outcome in the event of an adverse economic shock.
Germany, for instance, is a glaring case during the crisis with an optimum
interaction between labor market institutions. In particular, a substantial
degree of employment security associated with highly flexible working time
arrangements and, where feasible, also with efficient active labor market pro-
grams may have contributed to the success of a country in accommodating
the adverse shock without any employment loss. It is needless to say that
there is not a single recipe to be proposed to all countries. Rather each
country should prescribe their own recipes according to the country specific
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characteristics, learning from the Germany experience.
The Turkish economy, despite its commonalities with the new member
states of the EU, has many peculiar characteristics specific to its labor mar-
ket. The Turkish labor market, despite some rigidities, can not be charac-
terized overall as an inflexible market. The limited number of regulations,
and in cases where regulations exist, the limited degree of compliance leave
little room for the arguments which link the high rate of unemployment or
poor employment creation performance of the labor market to the so-called
rigidities. It can be asserted that even if substantial progress is achieved in
employment creation through flexibilization of the labor market, this progress
would not remove all labor market imbalances. The large number of unskilled
labor force in urban areas dropping out of agriculture, the dramatically low
rate of female participation especially in urban areas and the large size of
informal employment would still remain as major challenges. In this regard,
special attention should be paid to the labor demand side. There is in fact
considerable scope for interventions to improve the labor market outcomes,
particularly for women, including but not limited to regulations encouraging
nonstandard types of employment, effective training programs, country-wide
children’s nursery services and sufficient child raising allowances. The hope
is that this study opens further avenues into more detailed discussions on
tackling those challenges and developing policy implications.
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Figure 1.1: Labor force participation rate by gender, 2007
    Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
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Figure 1.2: Labor market developments in Turkey
between 1988 and 2012
      Source : Turkstat, 2013. 
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Figure 1.3: Labor market developments in the selected
EU countries between 2000 and 2010
Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
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Figure 1.4: Unemployment rate by gender between 2007 and 2012
        Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
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Figure 1.5: Percentage point changes in unemployment rate by
education levels between 2007 and 2010
 
Source: EUROSTAT, 2011. 
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Figure 1.6: Employment protection legislation index, 2010
      Source : OECD, 2013. 
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Figure 1.7: Spending on labor market policies
between 2007 and 2011
(as a share of GDP)
   Source : Eurostat, 2013.
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Figure 1.8: Annual change in the number of participants to
labor market programs between 2008 and 2011
(with respect to previous year)
   Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
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Figure 1.9: Number of beneficiaries of the unemployment insurance
fund in Turkey between 2007 and 2012
     Source : Iskur, 2013.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Rates of employment and labor force participation
1995 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Labor Force Participation Rate
Bulgaria : 60.7 66.3 67.8 67.2 66.5 65.9 67.1
Estonia 73.0 70.2 72.9 74.0 74.0 73.8 74.7 74.9
Germany 71.0 71.1 75.6 75.9 76.3 76.6 77.2 77.1
Latvia 70.1 67.2 72.8 74.4 73.9 73.2 72.8 74.4
Lithuania 72.1 70.8 67.9 68.4 69.8 70.5 71.4 71.9
Poland 67.2 65.8 63.2 63.8 64.7 65.6 66.1 66.5
Romania 71.5 68.4 63.0 62.9 63.1 63.6 63.3 64.2
Slovakia 69.2 69.9 68.3 68.8 68.4 68.7 68.7 69.4
Spain 61.1 65.4 71.6 72.6 73.0 73.4 73.7 74.1
Turkey 54.4 49.9 49.1 49.8 50.8 51.9 53.2 53.3
EU-15 67.2 69.0 71.9 72.3 72.4 72.4 72.5 73.0
EU-27 : 68.5 70.4 70.8 70.9 71.0 71.2 71.8
Employment Rate
Bulgaria : 51.5 61.7 64.0 62.6 59.7 58.4 58.8
Estonia 64.6 60.4 69.4 69.8 63.5 61.0 65.1 67.1
Germany 64.6 65.6 69.0 70.1 70.3 71.1 72.5 72.8
Latvia 59.9 57.5 68.3 68.6 60.9 59.3 60.8 63.1
Lithuania 62.3 59.1 64.9 64.3 60.1 57.8 60.3 62.2
Poland 58.9 55.0 57.0 59.2 59.3 59.3 59.7 59.7
Romania 65.4 63.0 58.8 59.0 58.6 58.8 58.5 59.5
Slovakia 60.6 56.8 60.7 62.3 60.2 58.8 59.3 59.7
Spain 46.9 56.3 65.6 64.3 59.8 58.6 57.7 55.4
Turkey 50.4 46.7 44.6 44.9 44.3 46.3 48.4 48.9
EU-15 60.1 63.4 66.8 67.1 65.8 65.4 65.5 65.2
EU-27 60.7 62.2 65.3 65.8 64.5 64.1 64.3 64.2
Source:  Eurostat, 2013; the earliest data for Estonia and Romania are from 1997 and for Latvia and  Lithuania 
               are from 1998.  Turkstat, 2013 for Turkey of the years 1995 and 2000.
Table 1.2: Labor market indicators in Turkey
by educational attainment, 2007
Labor force 
participation 
rate
Employment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Labor force 
participation 
rate
Employment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
Labor force 
participation 
rate
Employment 
rate
Unemployment 
rate
OVERALL
Total 46.2 41.5 10.3 69.8 62.7 10.0 23.6 21.0 11.0
Illiterate 18.1 17.1 5.2 36.9 32.3 12.4 14.4 14.2 1.7
Below high-school 44.6 44.2 9.8 69.0 61.8 10.3 19.6 18.4 7.8
High-school 48.8 42.1 13.9 64.9 57.7 11.0 28.4 22.1 22.1
Vocational high-school 64.5 56.8 12.0 80.6 72.7 9.7 36.4 28.8 20.9
University and above 77.3 69.8 9.7 82.6 76.4 7.4 69.4 59.8 13.9
URBAN
Total 44.3 39.0 12.0 69.3 61.8 10.8 19.8 16.6 16.1
Illiterate 9.3 7.9 15.1 33.0 25.8 21.8 5.1 4.7 7.6
Below high-school 40.0 39.6 12.0 67.5 59.5 11.6 12.8 12.3 14.4
High-school 47.5 40.8 14.1 63.4 56.4 11.0 28.0 21.6 22.7
Vocational high-school 62.7 55.1 12.2 79.7 71.9 9.8 35.2 27.7 21.2
University and above 76.9 69.4 9.7 82.2 76.0 7.4 69.2 59.7 13.6
Source : Turkstat, 2013.
MALE FEMALETOTAL
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Table 1.3: Main labor market outcomes in Turkey
1988 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Working age population 63.3 72.6 72.8 73.2 73.7 74.0 74.3
Labor force participation rate 57.5 46.2 46.9 47.9 48.8 49.9 50.0
Female 34.3 23.6 24.5 26.0 27.6 28.8 29.5
Male 81.2 69.8 70.1 70.5 70.8 71.7 71.0
Employment rate 52.6 41.5 41.7 41.2 43.0 45.0 45.4
Female 30.6 21.0 21.6 22.3 24.0 25.6 26.3
Male 75.1 62.7 62.6 60.7 62.7 65.1 65.0
Informal employment* 58.1 45.4 43.5 43.8 43.3 42.1 39.0
Unemployment rate 8.4 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9 9.8 9.2
Non-agricultural 14.4 12.6 13.6 17.4 14.8 12.4 11.5
Urban female 28.3 16.1 16.6 20.4 18.7 16.5 15.5
Urban male 9.7 10.8 11.6 15.3 12.6 10.2 9.4
Youth* 17.5 20.0 20.5 25.3 21.4 18.4 17.5
Long-term* 50.8 30.3 26.8 25.3 28.6 26.5 24.6
Source : Turkstat, 2013. 
* Informal employment is the share of undeclared employment in total employment, youth unemployment involves unemployed people 
less than 25 years old, and long-term unemployment refers to being unemployed  for more than one year. 
Table 1.4: Gross value-added and employment rate by sectors
1995 2000 2007 1995 2000 2007 1995 2000 2007
Agriculture Industry Services
Gross Value Added
Bulgaria 16.7 13.6 6.0 29.6 21.3 24.5 53.7 65.1 69.5
Estonia 5.8 4.8 3.1 26.3 22.0 20.3 67.9 73.2 76.6
Germany 1.3 1.3 1.0 25.4 25.3 26.5 73.3 73.4 72.5
Latvia 9.0 4.6 3.6 25.7 17.6 14.3 65.3 77.8 82.1
Lithuania 11.0 6.3 3.9 24.5 23.6 22.2 64.5 70.1 73.9
Poland 8.0 5.0 4.3 28.4 24.0 24.5 63.6 71.0 71.2
Romania 19.2 12.1 6.5 31.9 29.0 27.5 48.9 58.9 66.0
Slovakia 5.9 4.5 4.1 32.7 29.1 30.3 61.4 66.4 65.6
Spain 4.5 4.4 2.9 21.9 20.9 17.3 73.6 74.7 79.8
Turkey 15.7 10.8 8.5 26.4 24.6 22.3 57.9 64.6 69.2
EU-15 2.6 2.2 1.6 23.5 22.2 19.8 73.9 75.6 78.6
EU-27 2.9 2.3 1.8 23.7 22.4 20.2 73.4 75.3 78.0
Employment Rate
Bulgaria 22.5 12.3 7.2 26.2 33.0 35.8 51.3 54.6 57.0
Estonia 10.1 6.8 4.6 28.7 34.9 35.9 61.2 58.3 59.5
Germany 3.0 2.5 2.2 36.1 33.6 30.0 60.8 63.9 67.8
Latvia 17.7 14.2 9.4 22.5 27.0 29.0 59.8 58.8 61.7
Lithuania 19.3 18.1 10.2 22.8 27.3 30.9 57.9 54.5 58.9
Poland 27.9 17.4 14.0 25.2 31.7 31.1 46.9 50.9 54.9
Romania 45.3 39.0 25.8 22.4 28.7 33.1 32.3 32.3 41.1
Slovakia 9.0 6.9 4.2 30.1 37.3 39.5 60.9 55.8 56.3
Spain 7.9 6.6 4.5 30.4 31.0 29.4 61.7 62.5 66.1
Turkey 44.1 36.0 22.0 26.7 24.0 27.3 29.2 40.0 50.7
EU-15 4.8 4.0 3.2 30.6 29.0 26.4 64.6 67.0 70.4
EU-27 8.5 7.1 5.1 21.5 29.7 27.8 70.0 63.2 67.1
Source : Eurostat, 2013, data of employment rate of 1995 is from OECD, LFS, 2010. 
* Gross value added at basic prices as a percentage of total. 
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Table 1.5: Unemployment rate by age
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bulgaria 6.9 5.6 6.8 10.3 11.3 12.3
youth 14.1 11.9 15.1 21.8 25 28.1
Estonia 4.6 5.5 13.8 16.9 12.5 10.2
youth 10.1 12.1 27.5 32.9 22.3 20.9
Germany 8.7 7.5 7.8 7.1 5.9 5.5
youth 11.9 10.6 11.2 9.9 8.6 8.1
Latvia 6.5 8.0 18.2 19.8 16.2 14.9
youth 11.9 14.5 36.2 37.2 31 28.4
Lithuania 3.8 5.3 13.6 18.0 15.3 13.3
youth 6.8 12.2 29 35.3 32.2 26.4
Poland 9.6 7.1 8.1 9.7 9.7 10.1
youth 21.6 17.2 20.6 23.7 25.8 26.5
Romania 6.4 5.8 6.9 7.3 7.4 7.0
youth 20.1 18.6 20.8 22.1 23.7 22.7
Slovakia 11.2 9.6 12.1 14.5 13.7 14.0
youth 20.6 19.3 27.6 33.9 33.7 34
Spain 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 21.7 25.0
youth 18.2 24.6 37.8 41.6 46.4 53.2
Turkey 8.8 9.7 12.5 10.7 8.8 8.1
youth 17.2 18.4 22.7 19.7 16.8 15.7
EU-15 7.1 7.2 9.2 9.6 9.7 10.6
youth 15.2 15.7 19.9 20.4 20.7 22.3
EU-27 7.2 7.1 9.0 9.7 9.7 10.5
youth 15.7 15.8 20.1 21.1 21.4 22.8
Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
* Youth unemployment involves the age group less than 25 years. 
Table 1.6: Employment rates by nonstandard
employment contracts
(as a share of total employment)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bulgaria part-time 1.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2
temporary 5.1 4.9 4.6 4.4 4.0 4.4
Estonia part-time 7.2 6.4 9.4 9.8 9.3 9.2
temporary 2.2 2.4 2.5 3.7 4.5 3.5
Germany part-time 25.4 25.1 25.3 25.5 25.7 25.7
temporary 14.7 14.8 14.6 14.7 14.8 13.9
Latvia part-time 5.6 5.5 8.4 9.3 8.8 8.9
temporary 4.2 3.3 4.4 6.8 6.7 4.8
Lithuania part-time 8.1 6.5 8.0 7.7 8.3 8.8
temporary 3.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 2.8 2.6
Poland part-time 8.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.3 7.2
temporary 28.2 26.9 26.4 27.2 26.9 26.8
Romania part-time 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.7 9.3 9.1
temporary 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.7
Slovakia part-time 2.5 2.5 3.4 3.8 4.0 4.0
temporary 5.0 4.5 4.3 5.6 6.5 6.7
Spain part-time 11.6 11.8 12.6 13.1 13.7 14.6
temporary 31.7 29.3 25.5 25.0 25.4 23.7
Turkey part-time 7.9 8.7 10.6 11.1 11.3 11.5
temporary 11.8 11.1 10.7 11.4 12.2 12.0
EU-15 part-time 20.3 20.4 21.0 21.4 21.8 22.3
temporary 14.9 14.5 13.8 14.1 14.2 13.8
EU-27 part-time 17.6 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.8 19.2
temporary 14.6 14.1 13.6 13.9 14.1 13.7
Source: Eurostat, 2013. 
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Table 1.7: Short-time working schemes before and after the crisis
 Before the Crisis After the Crisis 
 Compensation Max. Duration Compensation Max. Duration 
TUR 
The amount of UIB (40% of 
the daily earnings, less than 
80% of the minumum wage) 
3 months 150% of the compensation before the crisis 6 months  
BUL no scheme EUR 613  3 months (until the end of 2010) 
LAT* no scheme EUR 98 per month during the training period   
6 months (until 
the end of the 
2010) 
LIT* no scheme 
SSC reimbursed to employers by PES at 
100% (plus training grant paid to 
workers amounting to up to 70% of the 
min. monthly wage during the training 
period) 
not specified 
POL no scheme part of the employees' remuneration  6 months  
ROM  
min. 75% of the basic wage 
corresponding to the 
workplace. 
not specified 
in addition to pre-crisis remuneration, 
exemption of the payment of SSC for 
both employers and employees 
3 months for the 
exemption of SSC 
payment 
SLOV no scheme EUR 339 
max 60 days 
(until Dec. 2010, 
with an 
exemption for 
workers who has 
serious 
operational 
reasons till Dec. 
2012) 
GER  
share of UIB (= 60-67% of 
reference net wage) plus 
supplements possible by 
employer  
6 months 
(extensions 
possible) 
SSC reimbursed to employers by PES at 
50% in the first 6 months of 
STW.Beginning with the seventh month 
of STW, the employers receive SSC 
reimbursed at 100%. 
24 months (until 
December 2010) 
SPA 
Eligibility to UIB (= 70% for 
max. 180 days, 60% of 
reference earnings for the 
remaining period) 
2 years  no change but 50% bonus in SSC payment until the end of 2009 no change 
Source: European Comission, 2010; Hijzen and Venn, 2011. 
* STW scheme in Latvia is designed under a training program. STW scheme in Lithuania is linked to training 
programs, but participation to training program is not compulsory as in the case of Latvia, but provides an incentive 
for workers. 
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Table 1.8: Average number of weekly working hours
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bulgaria 41.6 41.6 41.4 41.2 40.9 40.7
Estonia 39.5 39.5 38.7 38.8 38.7 38.8
Germany 35.5 35.6 35.7 35.7 35.5 35.5
Latvia 40.7 40.1 39.3 38.8 38.8 38.7
Lithuania 39.1 38.6 38.4 38.1 38.0
Poland 41.0 41.0 40.7 40.6 40.5 40.7
Romania 40.5 40.5 40.4 40.3 40.3 40.3
Slovakia 41.1 41.0 40.8 40.6 40.6 40.8
Spain 39.3 39.1 38.8 38.6 38.4 38.1
Turkey 51.0 50.5 49.4 49.3 48.9 48.4
EU-15 37.2 37.1 36.9 36.8 36.7 36.6
EU-27 37.9 37.8 37.6 37.5 37.4 37.3
Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
Table 1.9: Participation rate in labor market programs, 2011
(as a share of total participation)
Passive Measures
Labour market 
services Training
Employment 
incentives
Supported 
employment &
rehabilitation
Direct job 
creation
Start-up 
incentives
Out-of-work 
income 
maintenance & 
support
Bulgaria 0.0 2.2 2.9 0.3 9.1 0.2 85.2
Estonia 6.7 10.4 10.4 0.0 0.4 2.4 69.7
Germany 4.9 15.4 4.6 0.9 4.1 3.2 67.0
Latvia 0.1 14.6 6.7 0.0 24.5 0.4 53.8
Lithuania 0.7 3.2 0.0 8.6 12.2 0.0 75.4
Poland 0.1 0.7 8.8 43.7 0.7 10.0 35.9
Romania 0.0 6.4 9.9 0.0 2.4 0.0 81.3
Slovakia 0.0 0.1 21.6 3.4 13.3 25.2 36.5
Spain 0.2 6.1 33.5 1.4 0.0 6.5 52.4
EU-15 16.6 11.6 13.8 2.0 2.6 2.7 50.7
EU-27 15.1 10.8 13.5 3.8 2.8 2.8 51.1
Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
Notes : (1) The latest data available for EU-15 and EU-27 is at 2010. 
               (2) Unemployment benefits are excluded from passive measures. 
Active Measures
Table 1.10: Spending on labor market programs, 2011
(as a share of GDP)
Passive Measures
Labor market 
services Training
Employment 
incentives
Supported 
employment 
& rehabilitation
Direct job 
creation
Start-up 
incentives
Out-of-work 
income maintenance 
& support
Bulgaria 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.42
Estonia 0.08 0.09 0.04 : 0.00 0.01 0.50
Germany 0.35 0.26 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.99
Latvia 0.04 0.14 0.06 : 0.13 0.00 0.32
Lithuania 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 : 0.30
Poland 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.01 0.03 0.20
Romania 0.03 0.00 0.01 : 0.00 0.00 0.24
Slovakia 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.25
Spain 0.10 0.18 0.24 0.08 0.06 0.11 2.77
EU-15 0.25 0.24 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.04 1.37
EU-27 0.24 0.22 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.04 1.30
Source : Eurostat, 2013. 
* The latest data available for EU-15 and EU-27 is at 2010. 
Active Measures
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Table 1.11: ISKUR responsibilities regarding ALMPs
Applications 
during the 
year
Vacacies 
taken 
during the 
year
Placements 
during the 
year
Registered 
labor force
Registered 
unemployed
Number of 
courses
2007 656,969 186,922 111,375 759,104 696,538 1,200
2008 1,275,674 178,620 109,595 1,095,105 987,840 1,806
2009 1,435,024 165,890 118,278 1,858,855 1,689,349 10,113
2010 1,217,938 368,636 205,231 1,604,355 1,414,541 11,821
2011 1,398,355 660,623 363,672 2,192,145 1,844,965 16,594
2012 2,296,325 991,804 556,587 3,481,725 2,372,262 27,351
Source : Iskur, 2013. 
Table 1.12: Characteristics of unemployment
benefits schemes, 2007
 Payment rate  
(% of earning base) 
Earning 
base 
Max.  
Duration 
Employment (E) & 
Contribution (C) 
Requirements*   
Tur 50 Net 10 E: 600 days in 3 years C: 120 days continuously 
Bul 60 Gross 12 C: 9 months in 15 months 
Est 50 (40% after 100 days) Gross 12 C: 12 months in 36 months 
Lat 90% of min. wage (70% for new entrants) -- 6 .-- 
Lit 70 (later reducted to 60-50%) -- 6 C: 18 months in 36 months 
Pol Fixed amount (27% of average wage) -- 12 E+C: 1 year in 18 months 
Rom 50-60 Gross 9 C: 12 months in 24 months 
Slov 50 Gross 6 E+C: 3 years in 4 years 
Ger 60 Net 12 E: 12 months  C: 12 months in 3 years 
Spa 70 (60% after six months) Gross 24 C: 360 days in 6 years 
Source: OECD, 2012; 2007, Venn (2012). 
* Single worker without children, benefits may differ depending on family situation. All benefit amounts are  
shown on an annualized basis. "--" indicates that no information is available or not applicable. 
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Chapter 2
Do Non-Wage Cost Rigidities Slow
Down Employment? Evidence From
Turkey*
2.1 Introduction
The employment rate in Turkey, fluctuating between 40%-50%, has been ranking the lowest
in Europe for the last decade. Even Poland and Romania, amongst the lowest ranking EU
countries, have an employment rate more than 15 percentage points higher than Turkey.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the divergence in employment rate between Turkey
and the EU is mainly because of the dramatically low rate of female employment in Turkey.
As of 2007 only 21% of women were employed in Turkey, corresponding to one third of
the EU average.
Reasons behind the divergence in employment performances among countries have
been central to the literature in labor economics. A number of national and international
surveys point at high non-wage costs, particularly high social security contributions in
Turkey that create a burden on employers, and this in turn discourages employment cre-
ation in the formal sector while encouraging informal employment (OECD, 2007; TCEA,
2006; World Bank, 2006). This view, also shared by the Turkish policy makers, was em-
bodied in a policy intervention legislated in May 2008. The law prescribed a cut (up to
100%) in social security contributions borne by employers who hired young men (aged 18
to 29 years) and women (aged over 18 years) between July 1st, 2008 and June 30th, 2010.
The main goal of this paper is to conduct a micro-econometric analysis to evaluate the
effectiveness of this policy in creating formal employment for the targeted group (women),
something that, to the best of my knowledge, has not been done yet.
Employment subsidy policies in the form of social security contribution cuts have taken
*This study has been published in the IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2013, Vol.2:20.
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place in several countries mostly in the northern Europe such as France (e.g. Kramarz
and Philippon, 2001), Belgium (e.g. Goos and Konings, 2007), Sweden (e.g. Bennmarker
et al., 2008; Egebark and Kaunitz, 2010) and Finland (e.g. Huttunen et al., 2009) over
the last two decades. Chile (e.g. Gruber, 1997) and Turkey (e.g. Betcherman et al., 2010;
Uysal, 2013) are the only known examples of developing countries where employment
subsidies have empirically been analyzed. The employment subsidies generally target
disadvantaged groups (e.g. low-wage workers, the young or the old), certain sectors or
geographic locations rather than being applied to all workers and/or to all establishments.
The availability of certain target groups enables the researchers to analyze the effectiveness
of employment subsidies through difference-in-differences and/or triple difference strategy.
The studies have mostly found little or no evidence of an employment effect of labor tax
reduction with a few exceptions (i.e. Betcherman et al., 2010; Goos and Konings, 2007;
Uysal, 2013)1.
Following the previous studies, my empirical analysis relies on a difference-in-difference-
in-differences (triple difference) strategy with the intent of avoiding potential confounding
effects of the 2008 economic crisis which coincides with the policy period. More concretely,
firstly, the change in the outcome of women aged 30 to 34 (affected by the policy) is com-
pared with the change in the outcome of men of the same age group (unaffected by the
policy) between before and after the policy period, assuming that the outcomes of both
groups would have had a parallel trend in the absence of the policy. Then the resulting
difference is contrasted with the comparison of the relative outcomes of two treatment
groups (women and men aged between 25 and 29 years old) which are both subject to
the policy and to the crisis between pre- and post-policy period. The latter difference
enables the canceling out the crisis effect on women aged 30 to 34 under the assumption
that both age groups have been affected by the crisis in a similar way. The estimation
results suggest a positive and significant effect of the social security premium incentives
on creating employment for the targeted group (women) in the periods shortly after the
policy announcement. As far as is known to date, this study is the first attempt to explore
the causal relation between Turkish non-wage subsidy policy in 2008 and employment
creation. There is only little empirical research on developing countries in the field of em-
ployment subsidies. The existing literature, moreover, does not focus on the total number
of employment positions created by the policy that this paper intends to explore by using
flow data.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 documents an overview of non-wage cost
rigidities in the Turkish labor market and then introduces the policy of interest. Section
1The studies by Betcherman et al. (2010) and Uysal (2013) are of particular importance
for this analysis as they are conducted in Turkey. While the former evaluates two regional
employment subsidies having come into effect in 2004, the latter examines the policy of
interest, however, that paper, contrary to this study, does not conduct an econometric
analysis, but relies on descriptive statistics.
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2.3 describes the data and the technique used to construct flow data. The identification
strategy is discussed in Section 2.4, and estimation results are presented in Section 2.5.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 An Overview of Non-Wage Costs in Turkey
Various factors could play a role in explaining the relatively poor employment performance
of the Turkish labor market. One convincing explanation for the low rate of employment
in the formal sector alongside the large size of informal employment (accounting for 45%
of total employment) could be related to the factors increasing the cost of labor, apart
from wage cost, given that the only labor cost employers have to bear in the informal
sector is wage cost2.
The so-called “non-wage costs” refer to the part of total labor cost that is not directly
related to actual working hours, including income tax on wages, employers’ and employees’
contributions to the social security premiums and unemployment insurance fund. These
costs create a wedge between the cost the employer has to bear for hiring an employee and
the wage received by the employee. As the wedge gets wider, the labor cost incurred by
employers increases and employers become less willing to hire new workers in the formal
sector. A widely used indicator to measure the weight of non-wage costs is tax wedge. It
is calculated as the ratio of income taxes plus employers’ and employees’ social security
contributions (SSC) to total labor cost. The largest portion of the financial burden of
labor taxes is incurred by employers in the majority of the OECD countries, including
Turkey (OECD, 2010).
The tax wedge in Turkey, in respect of all three components, is comparable to the
EU countries as far as average-income earning singles and couples without children are
considered (OECD, 2010). On the other hand, Turkey’s ranking becomes well above the
EU average as the family size gets larger and the income level decreases. According to
the OECD data, the tax wedge in Turkey is the highest in the OECD as well as compared
to the EU countries in regards to the low-income families with two children (both single
parent at 67% of average wage, and one earner at average wage and the earner at 33% of
average wage) (ibid). The last point worthy of note is the remarkable fall in the tax wedge
in Turkey between 2007 and 2009. OECD (2010) reports that Turkey ranks alongside
the ten EU countries with the most significant reduction in tax wedge during this period,
accounting for almost seven percentage point decrease for low-earner single persons without
children. In fact, the decline in the tax wedge in Turkey corresponds to the period of the
approval of a recent regulation that stipulated a cut in employers’ SSC. An evaluation of
this regulation constitutes the main interest of this paper.
2The formal-informal distinction is made on the basis of registration in any social
security institution.
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2.2.1 The 2008 Employment Package in Turkey
In response to high non-wage costs in Turkey, the policy makers introduced a law also
known as “ employment package” in May 2008. The package basically provides an ex-
emption for employers from paying SSC with the intent of creating new employment for
women (aged over 18 years) and young men (aged between 18 and 29). The exemption
would gradually be phased out over a 5-year period. More specifically, the Unemployment
Insurance Fund would pay out 100% of employers’ SSC for the first year, 80% for the
second year, 60% for the third year, 40% for the fourth year and 20% for the fifth year.
Employers can benefit from this subsidy if, and only if, the individuals they hire from
the target group in any period between July 1st, 2008 and June 30th, 2010 are de facto
employed within one year following the effective date of the regulation and in addition
to the average number of previously registered insured workers having been declared in
the one-year period preceding the effective date of this regulation (Law No.5763, 2008).
The law also provides that the newly hired workers shall not be included among the
previously registered insured workers in the six-month period preceding the effective date
of the regulation. In order to avoid benefiting from the subsidy without creating new
employment, the law excludes circulation of workers within sub-companies of the same
employer; switching workers between direct or indirect partnerships, and also the situations
in which an employer closes his company, opens another one and transfers his workers from
the old to the new one.
In fact, the employment package that came into effect on 1 July 2008 was initially
designed for one year. However, after the global economic crisis hit the Turkish labor
market, a second employment package, extending the duration of the incentives for one
more year, was introduced in order to alleviate the unfavorable impacts of the crisis on the
effectiveness of the policy (Law No. 5838, 2009). Likewise, to overcome the detrimental
effects of the crisis on the labor market, similar employment incentives were introduced
in August 2009 (Uysal, 2013). These incentives, regulated under a provisional article
added to the Unemployment Insurance Law no. 4447, were provided for all new hirings,
regardless of gender and age, for a six-month period. As stated by Uysal (2013), these
additional incentives could mitigate the effectiveness of the policy of interest that targeted
only female and young male employment. The potential effects of the other employment
incentives on my analysis will be touched on later, in Section 2.5 while discussing the
estimation results.
2.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis relies on quarterly data for the period between 2006 and 2010 from
Turkish Household Labor Force Survey. The survey collects information on demographic
and labor market characteristics of household members, including information on educa-
45
tion, age, marital status, employment, working hours, income, unemployment, inactivity
and past work experience. The quarterly data allow distinguishing pre- and post-policy
periods such that the policy period ranges from the third quarter of 2008 to the second
quarter of 2010, while the period before the policy introduction is between the third quar-
ter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2008. Exploiting the advantage of using quarterly
data, it is possible for the policy effect to be estimated by each quarter within the policy
period, which will be further discussed in the following section. This will enable us to
address the concerns raised by Uysal (2013), in that, to characterize whether the policy
effect dies away after August 2009 probably because of the other employment incentives
that were enacted meanwhile (as mentioned in Section 2.2.1).
Labor supply, constituting the outcome variable of this analysis, can be measured
either through static variables such as annual working hours and employment probabilities
or through flow variables such as transitions between labor market states. These states
are conventionally defined as employment, unemployment and non-participation. The
literature related to flow analysis focuses on two different kinds of transitions: worker and
job flows. The latter measures whether a new position has been created or destroyed by
a firm rather than the changes in the labor market status of the worker which is captured
by the former measure (Davis et al., 2006). Basically, job flows are measured on the basis
of establishment or firm level data3, whereas worker flows are measured on the basis of
individual or household level data4. A flow analysis is considered more appropriate for
the aim of this paper that is to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy in creating new
employment, which is unlikely to be captured by static variables. Moreover, the data set
used in this paper, namely a household labor force survey makes a flow analysis based
on worker transitions rather appropriate. Although the survey does not include a panel
component, the retrospective questions in the questionnaire such as the labor market
status one year before the survey enable us to track individuals in two consecutive survey
periods. These retrospective questions are exploited to construct the flow data. For
instance, flows from employment to unemployment include the respondents who report
their current status as unemployed while their recalled status one year prior to the survey
was employed.5
3Some leading studies on measuring job flows are Davis and Haltiwanger (1992, 1999);
Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Burgess et al. (1994). All these studies calculate gross
job creation and destruction rates on the basis of establishment-level data from various
sources, especially from the United States (U.S.).
4Some leading studies on measuring worker flows are Bleakley et al. (1999), Shimer
(2005) and Davis et al. (2006) which use different data sources from the U.S.; Bell and
Smith (2002) and Elsby et al. (2010) which use labor force survey of the United Kingdom;
Haltiwanger and Vodopivec (1999) which use Estonian labor force survey.
5One could raise the recall bias problem caused by the response errors in estimating
the flows. Following Bell and Smith (2002), I check whether recall bias is a relevant issue
for this analysis by looking at the number of ‘inconsistent’ transitions. In particular, I
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New employment creation, defined as the difference between hirings and separations,
is calculated by subtracting flows into employment from flows out of employment (Davis et
al., 2006). Following Bell and Smith (2002) and Elsby et al. (2010), hiring is defined as the
sum of flows from unemployment to employment and flows from inactivity to employment,
whereas separation is equal to flows from employment to unemployment plus flows from
employment to inactivity. Flows between unemployment and inactivity are also examined
in order to capture a potential change in the job searching behavior of individuals. Table
2.1 presents flow rates for nine possible transitions between and within labor market states
of employment (E), unemployment (U) and inactivity(N). The flow variables displayed in
the table are denoted by two letters, representing the initial and arrival labor market
states, respectively.
According to the figures reported in Table 2.1, the Turkish labor market seems some-
what static with substantially low rates of transitions between labor market states relative
to transition rates within the states. During the sample period between 2006 and 2010,
around 40% of the population (aged 15 and above) are employed, and only one tenth of
them have transited into employment from unemployment or inactivity, the remainder
(36%) have already been in employment since the previous year. On the other hand, the
hiring rate (the sum of UE and NE) has seen almost one percentage point increase be-
tween 2008 and 2010 despite a constant trend at the outset of the sample period, which
provides rough evidence for the effectiveness of the policy of interest. Table 2.1 makes
clear that the increase in the hiring rate is attributable to the increase in UE rather than
NE. Moreover, the separation rate (the sum of EU and EN) has also seen more than one
percentage point increase between 2007 and 2009 probably because of the crisis effect, and
then it has started to decrease with the recovery from the crisis.
The policy could also have an impact on within-employment transitions through for-
malization of the existing job and/or by changing the type of employment (i.e. full-/part-
time versus permanent/temporary)6. However, there is no information in the survey about
the social security coverage and employment type of the previous year’s job. Therefore,
it is impossible to examine the employment-to-employment transitions in these respects.
Nevertheless, it is feasible to track what kind of jobs the individuals transit into without
compare the responses to the question asking the current and the previous year’s status of
the individuals with those related to the duration of their current status. That there is a
consistency between the two responses avoids us worrying about the recall bias problem.
For instance, the number of persons who report their current status as employed and their
status in the previous year as nonemployed is equal to the number of persons who report
the starting date of work as the survey year. The equality holds also for the flows into
unemployment and inactivity.
6According to Turkstat (2012) definition, the respondents who report themselves as
part-time employed include those whose usual weekly working hours are substantially
fewer than those having full-time jobs. In the Labor Act, normal work week for a full-time
worker is determined as 45 hours (Law 4857, 2003).
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knowing the type of job they were working during the previous year. As Table 2.2 presents,
47% of the employed people in the sample do not have a social security coverage as of 2007,
and transitions into employment are more likely to be into informal employment which
account for 63% of total flows into employment. Informality is more common among fe-
male workers relative to their male counterparts, especially among women aged 30 to 347.
In parallel, the incidence of transiting into informal employment is higher among women.
On the other hand, atypical employment arrangements such as part-time and tem-
porary employment do not represent a considerable proportion in total employment. As
displayed in Table 2.2, only one tenth of the employed people work in a part-time job
while the remainder have a full-time job. Similarly, only 5% of the employed hold tempo-
rary contracts. Part-time employment is higher by far among women for both age groups,
whereas it is the reverse as regards to temporary employment. The low incidence of atyp-
ical employment arrangements is accompanied by a larger share of transitions into regular
jobs. As a share of the total flows into employment, flows into full-time and permanent
employment account for 90% and 80%, respectively.8
2.4 Identification Strategy
Identification is achieved by exploiting the fact that the policy intervention targets specific
groups of individuals in the population and that the individuals can be observed before
and after the policy period. This allows using difference-in-differences (DD) strategy to
analyze the employment effect of the policy on women and young men. Recalling the policy
design described in Section 2.2.1, the treatment group (those targeted by the policy) could
be selected from among men aged 20-29 and women over 18 years old, and the control
group (those not targeted by the policy) could be selected from among men aged over 29
years. Given that the data do not provide exact ages of the individuals, but 5-year age
brackets, in order to explore the causal effect of the policy on employment creation for
young men, the relative outcomes of men aged 25 to 29 are compared with those of men
7For sake of brevity, Table 2.2 only includes the age groups of 25-29 and 30-34 on which
the identification strategy is built.
8In relation to the short-term employment arrangements, one may raise the point of
time aggregation bias. If individuals change their labor market status more than once
in a year, the recorded transitions would be biased as the short-term transitions across
states are suppressed in discrete data (Lin and Miyamoto, 2010). Given the small share
of (flows into) atypical employment along with the immobility of the labor force, short-
term transitions are not expected to be a worrying issue for the Turkish context. Above
all, according to the regulation of interest, the newly hired workers cannot be among
the previously registered workers of the same employer. Such a restriction on short-term
transitions would rule out a potential problem of time aggregation.
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aged 30 to 34 between before and after the policy introduction9. Similarly, to evaluate
the employment effect of the policy on women, the relative outcomes of women aged 30
to 34 are compared with those of men of the same age group between before and after the
policy introduction10.
In particular, firstly, a comparison in the changes in the outcome of the treatment
group between before and after the policy introduction is made by taking differences across
time but within the group, which enables us to remove any group specific unobserved effects
but time fixed effects. The same comparison is replicated for the control group. Then the
difference (across groups) of these two differences is noted which enables us to get rid of any
time trend11. In principle, the coefficient obtained through the double differences yields
the causal effect of the intervention under the assumption that the outcomes of treatment
and control groups would have had parallel trends in the absence of the policy (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009). The so-called common trend assumption is the key identifying assumption
of this strategy. Following Angrist and Pischke (2009), the credibility of this assumption
is validated by examining the long run employment trend in treatment and control groups
prior to the policy period. The employment trend for men and women in the concerned age
groups is roughly parallel between 2003 and 2008, as shown in Figure 2.112. In relation
to this, I test the difference in the mean of relevant observable characteristics between
9One may raise the point that men aged 30, for instance by the third quarter of 2009,
were indeed in the treatment group one year before, when they were 29, although they are
counted in the control group as the treatment and control groups are constructed based
on the current age cohort. This could create a problem for the empirical analysis as the
outcome variable of interest is a flow variable which is constructed based on the labor
market status in the previous survey year. More concretely, the estimation results would
be understated. Unfortunately, it is not possible to capture age changes up to 5 years due
to the unavailability of the data. However, the extent of the problem is not expected to
be too large to threaten the overall estimation results given that this problem contains
only men at the age of 30 in the survey period between the third quarter of 2009 and the
second quarter of 2010. In other words, the control group is clean of treated individuals
for the first half of the policy implementation year as well as for men aged over 30 years
old.
10It is considered more plausible to compare closer age groups with similar characteristics
rather than, for instance, comparing 60-year-old women with 30-year-old-men who have
different probabilities of finding a job because of their unlike age-specific characteristics.
11See appendix 2.A.1 for the formal expression of the DD strategy within a regression
framework.
12The first red vertical line in Figure 2.1 is on 2003 which denotes an approximate date
for the end of the 2001 crisis, a domestically oriented crisis hit hard the labor market.
The latter vertical line, on the other hand, is on 2008, belonging to the year of policy
introduction as well as the onset of the global economic crisis. Furthermore, I also check
the trend in hiring and separation rate of the treatment and control groups between 2006
and 2010 given that the micro data are available only for this period. Similar to what
is observed for the employment trend, the flow rates show quite a parallel trend for the
concerning subgroups till the policy period, as can be seen in Figure 2.2.
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the treatment and control group. The results support the hypothesis of no significant
difference between the two groups.
One potential problem in this analysis would be if employers had expected the en-
actment of the policy and strategically delayed hiring new workers or fired the existing
workers in the control group until the law was introduced with the intent of benefiting
from the incentives. It is needless to worry about such a problem in this context given
that the policy was announced only two months before the implementation period, and
benefiting from the incentives is conditional on additional hiring as mentioned before.
The DD strategy would have been appropriate to analyze the causal effect of the pol-
icy intervention if the crisis had not affected the labor market outcomes of the subgroups
differently. Given the differential effect of the crisis across treatment and control groups,
as can be seen in Figure 2.3, the policy evaluation through DD strategy is potentially
confounded by the crisis effect. In order to rule out the possible confounding effects of the
crisis, difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) strategy is exploited. This strategy is
advantageous over a double difference analysis in policy evaluation, especially in the pres-
ence of an economic shock which could play a determining role in the effectiveness of the
policy. Technically speaking, DDD strategy requires three dimensions to be implemented,
which are age, gender and time in this context. Since the policy of interest targets all
women over 18 years old, it is unlikely to use a group of women as a control group and
accordingly to conduct a DDD analysis for evaluating the policy effect on men. Therefore,
the evaluation based on DDD strategy is confined to the effect of the policy on women.
As a first step, a standard DD estimator is implemented by comparing the change in the
outcome of women aged 30 to 34 (affected by the policy) with the change in the outcome
of men of the same age group (unaffected by the policy) between pre- and post-policy
period, assuming that the outcomes of both groups would have had a parallel trend in the
absence of the policy. Then the resulting difference is contrasted with the comparison of
the relative outcomes of two treatment groups (women and men aged between 25 and 29
years old) who are both subject to the policy and to the crisis between pre- and post-policy
period13. This difference basically enables us to cancel out the crisis effect on women aged
30 to 34 under the assumption that both age groups have been affected by the crisis in a
similar way.
The validity of this last assumption is tested in two steps. The first step is to test
whether there is an age effect. To do this, a comparison is made in the relative outcomes of
women aged 30 to 34 with their younger counterparts aged 25 to 29 between two periods
before the policy intervention. Finding a statistically significant estimate of the coefficient
of the interaction term would suggest the existence of an age effect, which would violate
the assumption unless the age effect is the same for both genders. The second step is to
13See appendix 2.A.2 for a formal expression of DDD strategy within a regression frame-
work.
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test whether the age effect is the same for women and men. To this end, the DDD analysis
is replicated for the pre-policy period. If the null hypothesis that the coefficient estimate(s)
of the triple interaction term are significantly different from zero is not rejected, it would
imply that a comparison between two age cohorts would eliminate the differential crisis
effect even if there is evidence of age effect, and so the identifying assumption would hold.
In such a scenario, the second step test would be sufficient to prove the validity of the
assumption. Given that no significant estimate was found in either step, the first step
results are not presented for sake of brevity. The placebo test results are discussed in
more detail in the following section.
A last point worthy of note is the possible heterogeneity in the policy effect across
periods. In particular, the policy may be more effective as time goes on or, on the other
hand, the effect may be stronger just after the announcement of the policy, then phases out
with the passing of time. In order to see whether the policy effect is quarter- and/or year-
specific, three specifications are estimated based on the empirical strategy just outlined
above. First, the policy effect is imposed to be constant across quarters over the period.
More specifically, there is no allowance for quarter and year specific dummies, and the
comparison is between the entire period after the policy introduction and the entire period
before the policy. This specification is called “period specific” policy effect. Next, the
policy effect is imposed to be constant across quarters within a year, but allowing for
variation between years by introducing year specific dummies for the policy period. This
specification enables the estimation of the policy effect for each year over the policy period.
Thirdly, an allowance is made for heterogeneous policy effect across quarters by including
year specific quarter dummies. This time the comparison is between each quarter within
the policy period and the entire period before the policy intervention. This most flexible
specification provides separate estimates of the policy effect for each quarter over the
policy period14. Furthermore, each quarter within the policy period is compared to the
corresponding quarter in the pre-policy period in order to test the role of seasonality in
policy effectiveness.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 presents the aggregate effect of the policy over the period. In fact, the same
parameter is estimated in each column of the table, however, each column represents a
different specification changing depending on the restriction imposed, as described in the
previous section. The estimation results presented in this and in the following tables
include all the control variables (i.e. completed years of schooling and marital status of
the individuals, number of children in the household and a variable for urban/rural divide)
14See appendix 2.A.3 for formal expression of specifications within a regression frame-
work.
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in levels and of their interactions, although adding control variables does not change the
significance of the results, but the precision of the estimates. The standard errors displayed
in the tables are bootstrap standard errors stratified at gender and age level15.
According to the DD estimation results displayed in the top and middle panels of
Table 2.3, the probability of being hired for men aged 25 to 29 increased significantly
above that for men aged 30 to 34 after the policy introduction, whereas a negative change
was observed in the probability of being hired for women aged 30 to 34 relative to men
of the same age group. The estimated negative effect of the policy on women could be
attributable to the inability of the DD strategy in eliminating the differential effect of the
crisis on different genders. That the negative and significant estimate obtained from the
DD strategy turns into positive after canceling out the crisis effect implies the confounding
role of the crisis in evaluating the policy.
The discussion henceforth continues with the DDD estimation results which, I believe,
are more reliable as this strategy enables the elimination of the potential confounding fac-
tors. The credibility of the DDD results, namely the validity of the identifying assumption
of the DDD analysis is checked through a placebo test using data belonging to the pre-
policy period, as mentioned in Section 2.4. In particular, the DDD analysis is replicated
based on the comparison of two periods both are before the policy intervention. As Table
2.B.1 in the appendix displays, the null hypothesis is not rejected for any quarter, which
provides no evidence of the violation of the assumption. Consistent with the test results,
Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 show similar patterns of two age cohorts within a gender.
As mentioned above, the estimation results presented in Table 2.3 differ in terms of
the restriction imposed. In particular, the restriction loosens as going from column (3)
to column (1). Accordingly, the magnitude of the estimate of the policy effect becomes
15Considering the concerns about the reliability of the inferences in DD estimation
strategies using OLS standard errors, a bootstrap technique is used to fix-up the standard
errors. In particular, the bootstrapped standard errors presented in the tables are based on
a random resampling of individuals repeated 1000 times from each of the four stratums on
which the treatment and control groups are built; namely men and women aged 25-29 and
30-34. As indicated by earlier work, the main goal is to preserve the dependence structure
in the target population so as to rule out the over-rejection problem induced by the serial
correlation in the common group component in the error term (Angrist and Pischke, 2009;
Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron et al., 2008; Conley and Taber, 2011; Donald and Lang,
2007). Despite these concerns, I found only a small difference between the bootstrap and
the OLS (robust) standard errors which is observable from the fourth decimal. Though
not presented in the paper, standard errors computed with different bootstrap designs,
for instance, without strata option and with a different number of replications also deliver
similar results. On the other hand, following a widely applied approach for correcting
OLS standard errors, I estimate clustered-robust variance estimator with clusters at the
level of policy variable, namely age, gender and year specific quarters. The insufficient
number of observations in each cluster and accordingly little variability within clusters
yields inconsistent estimates, and thus the clustered standard errors are not presented
here. If someone is interested, all the results can be provided upon request.
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higher as variation among years and across quarters is allowed. The DDD estimation
results, displayed in the bottom panel of Table 2.3, suggest that as for the most restricted
specification which imposes constant policy effect across quarters, the probability of being
hired for a woman aged 30 to 34 increased by 0.2% relative to a man of the same age
group after the policy introduction. The same probability increased by 1% as for the less
restricted specification which allows the policy effect to vary between years, and by 3%
as for the most flexible specification which allows for variation across quarters. However,
neither the estimates of the variable hiring nor the variable separation are statistically
significant as far as the aggregate effect of the policy over the period is concerned.
There may be some quarters where the policy is effective while in other quarters
the estimated policy effect could be null, thus aggregating over the policy period would
make the estimates statistically insignificant. The validity of this hypothesis was checked
through the Wald test and evidence of heterogeneous policy effect across quarters was
discovered, as presented in Table 2.4. The estimation results reported in the table point
out that the disaggregation of the policy effect by quarter yields positive and statistically
significant results for certain periods. In particular, the probability of being hired for
women aged 30 to 34 above men of the same age group increased by 1.4% in the third
quarters of 2008 and 2009, and by 1.6% in the fourth quarter of 2009, after removing the
crisis effect16. Moreover, the positive effect of the policy on the variable hiring is mostly
attributable to the flows from unemployment rather than those from inactivity, which is
in accordance with the transition statistics presented in Table 2.1.
According to the estimation results reported in the tables, the coefficient estimates of
the variable separation are always statistically insignificant. This is actually in line with
the expectation given that the eligibility for the subsidy is on the condition of hiring new
employees in addition to the average number of registered workers declared in the previous
year. This condition rules out the possibility that employers fire an existing worker and
hire a new one at the end of the first year to benefit from the full subsidy. Nevertheless,
both employment creation and destruction effects of the policy are estimated so as to
measure net employment growth.
What could be the underlying reasons behind the significant policy effect in some
quarters along with insignificant effect in the others? First, a check was made whether
seasonality matters in characterizing the policy effect by introducing non-year specific
quarter dummies in the interaction term. In particular, each quarter over the policy
period is compared with the same quarter before the policy intervention. For instance,
the third quarter after the policy period (of 2008 and 2009) is compared with the third
quarter before the policy period (of 2006 and 2007). The results indicate no evidence of
16As for the year specific policy effect, the policy effect is null even if the average policy
effect is disaggregated by year. The estimation results of this specification are reported in
the bottom panel of Table 2.4.
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seasonality in the sense that the coefficients of the interaction terms were found statistically
insignificant. In fact, there is one evident explanation for the quarter-specific pattern in
the policy effect. As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, the policy announced in May 2008 was
initially designed for one year. After the economic crisis hit the labor market by the
third quarter of 2008, the government decided to extend the policy period for one more
year, and the statistically significant estimates in 2009 are detected precisely in quarters
at the beginning of the second implementation year of the policy. As proposed by Uysal
(2013), the reason why the policy effect dies out by the end of 2009 could be related to the
introduction of new employment incentives provided for all new employment creation17.
Relying on the coefficient estimates in Table 2.4, further light will be shed on how
much new employment was created by the policy. Given that new employment is defined
as the difference between total hirings and separations, the relevant question is which
aggregation level is proper for calculating total hirings and separations. Since the main
interest of this study is to explore the causal effect of the policy on the treated, hiring and
separation are aggregated by multiplying the corresponding probability with the number
of women aged between 30 and 34 years (treated group) in the policy period. Focusing on
the quarters in which there is evidence of significant policy effect, it was established that
the policy created 92 new employment positions for women aged between 30 to 34 years in
the third quarter of 2008, 54 positions in the third quarter of 2009 and 63 positions in the
fourth quarter of 2009. This amounts to totally 209 new employment positions, accounting
for 1.4% of the number of women in the relevant age group in the sample. Remarkably
these magnitudes are similar to the employment gains reported by Uysal (2013) using
descriptive statistics.
Furthermore, there could be a heterogeneity in the policy effect across sectors given
that the female labor force is not evenly distributed across sectors in Turkey. The services
sector is the largest employer for women as depicted in Figure 2.4. Almost half of the
employed women aged 30-34 are hired in the services sector, whereas the industry and
construction sectors account for less than one fifth of the female employment. To disag-
17Uysal (2013) also raises concerns that regional employment incentives, having been
enacted since 2004, could limit the effectiveness of the policy of interest. Given that the
regional incentives are in force throughout the entire period, before and after the policy
introduction, they could be considered as an overall change in the economy provided that
the provinces benefiting from the regional incentives do not change over the period. In
this sense, the potential effects of the regional incentives can be canceled out by the triple
difference method under the main assumption of this strategy; that is, other institutional
changes (such as regional incentives) affect the employment of both the treatment and
control groups similarly during the sample period. The ideal test of this hypothesis would
be to run the analysis region by region so as to check whether there is any difference in
the DDD results between targeted and non-targeted regions. However, unfortunately, the
quarterly data do not provide information at the provincial level. Therefore, this paper,
as in the case of Uysal (2013), is confined to a national-level analysis.
54
gregate the policy effect by sector, the data are stratified by four main sectors; services,
industry, agriculture and construction. The estimation results presented in Table 2.5 sug-
gest that the probability of being hired for women aged 30 to 34 in the services sector
increased by 6.2% in the third quarter of 2008, 4.1% in the third quarter of 2009 and 4.2%
in the fourth quarter of 2009 relative to their male counterparts of the same age cohort
-after removing the crisis effect. Consistent with the previously reported results in Table
2.4, there is no significant effect in the other quarters which results in an insignificant
effect when aggregating over the policy period. Moreover, no evidence was found of sig-
nificant policy effect in the other sectors for any quarter in line with the aforementioned
expectations.
Lastly, the effect of the policy on job searching behavior of the individuals is exam-
ined. The DDD analysis suggests a positive but statistically insignificant policy effect on
transitions from inactivity to unemployment, but on the other hand, a strongly negative
effect on transitions from unemployment to inactivity. These results imply that the policy
prevents the women in the treatment group from withdrawing from the labor market, but
does not encourage the women outside the market to start looking for a job. A possible
effect of the policy might be on employment-to-employment transitions through formal-
ization of the existing employment. However, as mentioned in Section 2.3, the data do
not allow us to determine whether the increase in formal employment has resulted from
the formalization of previously non-registered (informal) employment, neither can it deter-
mine whether the policy has affected the probability of changing the type of employment.
What can be done primarily is to estimate what kind of jobs the labor transited into
due to the policy by stratifying the data. The DDD results indicate that the policy is
effective only in regular jobs (i.e. full-time and permanent). This is in consistency with
the low share of atypical employment arrangements (i.e.part-time and temporary) in total
employment, presented in Table 2.2. Considering that informal workers are not covered
by social security and accordingly by the policy, naturally the policy effect is only seen in
the formal sector, which is in line with the findings reported by Uysal (2013). This could
also explain the ineffectiveness of the policy in atypical employment arrangements given
that workers hired in part-time or temporary jobs are unlikely to be covered by a formal
protection instrument.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the impact of a reduction in the employer’s share of the social security
premiums on employment creation for the policy target group (women). Using quarterly
data for the period of 2006-2010 from the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey, the
employment effect of the policy on women is estimated through a triple difference tech-
nique. Although the aggregate policy effect over the period -net of the crisis effect- is not
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significant, the disaggregation of the policy effect by quarter yields positive and statisti-
cally significant results for the quarters shortly after the policy announcements. While the
effectiveness of the policy could be attributable to the importance of re-announcement,
the reason why the effect dies out at the end of 2009 could be related with the mitigating
effect of the other incentives to all new hirings having been enacted meanwhile.
The estimation results based on the triple difference strategy could be interpreted as
the causal effect of the policy given that the results are robust to different specification
tests which support the internal validity of the identification strategy. Moreover, the overall
consistency with the findings of Uysal (2013) strengthens the power of the estimates. This
paper is not only the first study to conduct a causal evaluation of a recent non-wage
subsidy policy in Turkey, but also proposes the importance of announcement frequency
in the effectiveness of the policy for the agenda of Turkish policy makers, which could be
relevant also for future policy designs in the Turkish labor market.
According to the Social Security Institution records, five sixths of total applications
for benefiting from the subsidy were made after the second announcement of the policy
(Topcu, 2011). This supports the argument of the importance of re-announcement to
enhance the policy effectiveness. Moreover, the policy has recently been revised upon
the request of the public opinion to extend the coverage of the incentives. According to
the new law, the incentives shall be provided for all new hirings without a restriction on
gender and age (Law No. 6111, 2011). It is hoped that this study will be a basis for future
research on evaluation of such similar policies in Turkey.
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Appendix
2.A. Identification Strategy within a Regression Frame-
work
2.A.1. Difference-in-Differences Strategy
This subsection describes the specification estimated through difference-in-differences
technique -using quarterly data from the third quarter of 2006 to the second quar-
ter of 2010-. To do so, it begins by introducing the following notations:
1. Let Q(i,j) for (i, j) ∈ T denote the time dummy variable which is equal to
1 for the ith quarter of the jth year, and 0 otherwise. The order of the
years is the obvious one: 2006 is the first, 2007 is the second and so on. In
particular, Q(2,3) is 1 if and only if the variable under consideration is the
second quarter of the year 2008, and 0 otherwise. Given that the sample
period is ranging from the third quarter of 2006 to the second quarter of
2010, the set T is defined as:
T = {(3, 1), (4, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (3, 2), (4, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3),
(3, 3), (4, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 4), (1, 5), (2, 5)}.
2. The group of people consisting of men aged 30 to 34 is defined to be the
control group, while the group of people consisting of either men aged 25
to 29 or women aged 30 to 34 is defined to be the treatment group. Once
the control and the treatment groups are introduced, the dummy variable
G called the group indicator is defined to be 1 for the treatment group and
0 for the control group.
3. The dummy variable P called the time indicator is by definition equal to
1 for the period following the date of the policy introduction (i.e. between
3rd quarter of 2008 and 2nd quarter of 2010), and 0 for the period preceding
the date of the policy introduction (i.e. between 3rd quarter of 2006 and 2nd
quarter of 2008). For future reference I introduce the set
R = {(3, 3), (4, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 4), (4, 4), (1, 5), (2, 5)}.
4. Xk denotes a vector of other control variables including education level,
marital status and the living area (urban/rural) of the individual k, and
pairwise interactions of these controls.
Finally, the following regression is estimated through OLS:
Yk =
∑
(i,j)∈T
α(i,j) ·Q(i,j) + β1 ·G+ β2 · (P ·G) +X ′k · δ + εk (2.1)
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where Yk denotes the outcome variable of the individual k which is a measure of
flow data (i.e. labor force transitions between employment, unemployment and
inactivity). The coefficient of the interaction term β2 constitutes the main interest
of this analysis yielding the average effect of the policy over the period. This
coefficient can simply be obtained through the following differences:
β2 = {E(Yk|G = 1, P = 1)− E(Yk|G = 1, P = 0)}
− {E(Yk|G = 0, P = 1)− E(Yk|G = 0, P = 0)}
2.A.2. Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences Strategy
In this subsection, the triple difference strategy is exploited to evaluate the pol-
icy effectiveness with the aim of ruling out the potential confounding effects of
the recent economic crisis which are unlikely to be eliminated through standard
difference-in-differences technique (indicated in the previous section). While keep-
ing the notations of the previous section intact, some new variables are introduced:
1. F denotes the gender dummy which is equal to 1 if the individual is female,
0 otherwise.
2. A denotes the age dummy which is equal to 1 for ages between 30 and 34,
and 0 for ages between 25 and 29.
3. The products (P ·A), (A·F ) and (P ·F ) are pairwise interactions between the
indicators of P , A and F and the product (P ·F ·A) is the triple interaction
of the same indicators.
The following regression is estimated by OLS:
Yk =
∑
(i,j)∈T
α(i,j) ·Q(i,j) + γ1 · F + γ2 ·A+ γ3 · (A · F )
+ γ4 · (P ·A) + γ5 · (P · F ) + γ6 · (P · F ·A) +X ′k · δ + εk (2.2)
where the coefficient (γ6) of the triple interaction term indicates the average effect
of the policy over the period.
γ6 could also be obtained through the difference in double differences of:
{[E(Yk|A = 1, F = 1, P = 1)− E(Yk|A = 1, F = 0, P = 1]}
−{[E(Yk|A = 1, F = 1, P = 0)− E(Yk|A = 1, F = 0, P = 0]}
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where women are subject to the policy, whilst men are not.
{[E(Yk|A = 0, F = 1, P = 1)− E(Yk|A = 0, F = 0, P = 1)]}
−{[E(Yk|A = 0, F = 1, P = 0)− E(Yk|A = 0, F = 0, P = 0)]}
where both groups are subject to the policy and to the crisis.
While the first double difference is exactly the same as the standard difference-
in-differences estimator for the treatment group of women aged 30 to 34, the second
double difference enables the canceling out the differential effect of the crisis, and
the difference between these two yields the causal effect of the intervention.
2.A.3. Specifications
In this subsection there is an introduction to three types of specification depending
on the restriction imposed on the time indicator in the interaction term.
(i) Period specific policy effect : Estimating equation (2.1) and equation (2.2),
the policy effect is imposed to be constant across quarters over years. The double
difference estimator is constructed by interacting the group indicator (G) with a
single time dummy (P ) that is equal to 1 for the whole period following the date
of the policy introduction, and 0 for the whole period preceding the date of the
policy introduction. Likewise, the triple estimator is obtained by interacting the
gender dummy (F ) and age dummy (A) with the same time dummy (P ).
(ii) Year specific policy effect : The constant policy effect is imposed across
quarters within a year, but allowing variation between years. To this end, I in-
troduce a new dummy variable Sm for m ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which is defined to be equal
to 1 for the mth year within the policy period, and 0 otherwise. Indeed, S1 is
equal to 1 if year is 2008 and the period is after the policy introduction (i.e. third
and fourth quarter), S2 is equal to 1 if year is 2009 and S3 is equal to 1 if year
is 2010 and the period is until the end of the policy period (i.e. the first and sec-
ond quarter). The difference-in-differences estimator (see equation (2.1)) becomes
the sum of three interaction terms each of which belongs to separate years within
the policy period (see equation (2.3)). Similarly, the triple difference estimator
(see equation (2.2)) can be written as the interaction of the age, gender and time
dummies aggregated over three years within the policy period (see equation (2.4)).
Keeping the notations the same as the previous section, it is estimated that:
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Yk =
∑
(i,j)∈T
α(i,j) ·Q(i,j) + β ·G+
3∑
m=1
φm · (Sm ·G) +X ′k · δ + εk (2.3)
Yk =
∑
(i,j)∈T
α(i,j) ·Q(i,j) + γ1 · F + γ2 ·A+ γ3 · (A · F ) +
3∑
m=1
θm · (Sm ·A)
+
3∑
m=1
ρm · (Sm · F ) +
3∑
m=1
φm · (Sm · F ·A) +X ′k · δ + εk (2.4)
where φm indicates the policy effect in the m-th year within the policy period, and∑3
m=1 φm refers to the aggregate effect of the policy over the entire policy period.
(iii) Quarter-year specific policy effect : The policy effect is allowed to vary
across quarters over years. In this specification, the difference-in-differences es-
timator in equation (2.1) and the triple difference estimator (see equation (2.2))
become the sum of eight interaction terms each of which belong to separate quar-
ters within the policy period (see equation (2.5) and equation (2.6)).
Yk =
∑
(i,j)∈T
α(i,j)Q(i,j) + β ·G+
∑
(i,j)∈R
φ(i,j)(Q(i,j) ·G) +X ′k · δ + εk; (2.5)
Yk =
∑
(i,j)∈T
α(i,j)Q(i,j) + β1 · F + β2 ·A
+ β3 · (A · F ) +
∑
(i,j)∈R
θ(i,j)(Q(i,j) ·A) +
∑
(i,j)∈R
ρ(i,j)(Q(i,j) · F )
+
∑
(i,j)∈R
φ(i,j)(Q(i,j) · F ·A) +X ′k · δ + εk (2.6)
where φ(i,j) indicates the policy effect in the i-th quarter of the j-th year, and∑
(i,j)∈R φ(i,j) refers to the aggregate effect of the policy over the entire policy
period.
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2.B. Appendix Tables
Table 2.B.1: Placebo test results for the DDD estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hiring UE NE Separation EU EN
Year-Quarter Specific Policy Effect
DDDQ3−06 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 0.006 0.000 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ4−06 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ1−07 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ2−07 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ3−07 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.007 0.000 0.007
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
DDDQ4−07 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.002
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ1−08 0.007 0.011 -0.005 0.002 0.000 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ2−08 -0.005 0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
No. Obs. 190,035 190,035 190,035 190,035 190,035 190,035
R2 0.63 0.51 0.28 0.40 0.33 0.15
Year Specific Policy Effect
DDD2006 -0.011 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 -0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
DDD2007 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
DDD2008 0.001 0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
No. Obs. 190,035 190,035 190,035 190,035 190,035 190,035
R2 0.63 0.51 0.28 0.40 0.32 0.15
Robust standard errors in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Employment rates of the treatment and control groups
between 2000 and 2010
   Source : Turkstat, 2013. 
Figure 2.2: Flow rates of the treatment and control groups
between 2006 and 2010
   Source : Author's own calculations based on microdata from Turkstat. 
  Note : Flow rate is the ratio of the number of flows to the number of individuals of the correponding gender and age group. 
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Figure 2.3: Unemployment and employment rates of treatment and
control groups between 2007 and 2010
 
 
 
Source: Turkstat, 2011.  
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Figure 2.4: Sectoral composition of the employment, 2007
(as a share of total employment in the corresponding age group)
 
 Source: Author's own calculations based on micro data from Turkstat. 
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Tables
Table 2.1: Rates of stock and flow variables
(as a percentage of population aged 15 and over)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Stock Variables
Employment (E) 40.2 40.0 40.1 39.6 41.4
Unemployment (U) 4.4 4.4 4.8 6.4 5.3
Inactivity (N) 55.4 55.7 55.1 54.0 53.3
Flow Variables
UE 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.7
NE 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.4
EU 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.3 1.5
EN 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.7
NU 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3
UN 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
EE 36.0 35.8 36.0 35.6 36.3
UU 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.8 2.6
NN 53.0 53.0 52.3 51.1 50.5
Source: Author’s own calculations based on micro data from Turkstat.
Table 2.2: Informal and atypical employment, 2007
Total Men Women Men Women
(15+) (25-29) (25-29) (30-34) (30-34)
As a share of total employment:
Informal 47.6 33.0 42.1 28.8 50.7
Flows into Formal 3.8 5.1 7.1 2.6 3.7
Flows into Informal 6.7 4.6 7.2 3.0 7.3
As a share of total flows into employment:
Flows into Informal 63.6 47.2 50.4 53.8 66.4
As a share of total employment:
Part-time 9.4 2.7 14.0 2.7 18.4
Flows into Full-time 9.5 9.4 12.6 5.4 8.9
Flows into Part-time 1.1 0.4 1.7 0.2 2.3
As a share of total flows into employment:
Flows into Part-time 10.0 3.6 12.2 3.3 20.3
As a share of total employment:
Temporary 5.4 5.8 3.0 5.6 4.6
Flows into Permanent 6.1 6.6 10.3 3.3 6.0
Flows into Temporary 1.5 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.8
As a share of total flows into employment:
Flows into Temporary 19.6 17.4 8.7 26.2 23.2
Source: Author’s own calculations based on micro data from Turkstat.
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Table 2.3: Aggregate effect of the policy over the period
(1) (2) (3)
Quarter-year specific Year specific Period specific
Difference-in-Differences: Young Men
Hiring 0.050* 0.013* 0.003
(0.027) (0.008) (0.003)
UE 0.024 0.007 0.002
(0.020) (0.008) (0.002)
NE 0.017* 0.006* 0.001
(0.009) (0.003) (0.001)
Separation 0.005 0.000 0.001
(0.019) (0.007) (0.002)
EU 0.019 0.004 0.002
(0.017) (0.006) (0.002)
EN -0.014 -0.004 -0.002
(0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
Difference-in-Differences: Women
Hiring -0.052*** -0.018*** -0.007***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.002)
UE -0.056*** -0.021*** -0.007***
(0.014) (0.005) (0.002)
NE 0.004 0.003 0.000
(0.010) (0.004) (0.001)
Separation -0.020 -0.004 -0.003
(0.016) (0.006) (0.002)
EU -0.073*** -0.023*** -0.009***
(0.013) (0.005) (0.002)
EN 0.051*** 0.019*** 0.006***
(0.010) (0.004) (0.001)
Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences: Women
Hiring 0.030 0.010 0.002
(0.026) (0.01) (0.003)
UE 0.023 0.007 0.002
(0.021) (0.008) (0.003)
NE 0.007 0.003 0.001
(0.015) (0.006) (0.002)
Separation 0.007 0.001 0.001
(0.023) (0.009) (0.003)
EU 0.010 0.001 0.001
(0.018) (0.007) (0.002)
EN -0.003 0.000 0.000
(0.014) (0.005) (0.002)
∗ Bootstrap standard errors with 1000 replications are in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).
∗∗ The number of observations of difference-in-differences for “young men” is 144,954 and for “women”
is 147,534; and that of difference-in-difference-in-differences is 305,590.
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Table 2.4: DDD estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hiring UE NE Separation EU EN
Year-Quarter Specific Policy Effect
DDDQ3−08 0.014** 0.005 0.009** -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ4−08 -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ1−09 -0.008 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
DDDQ2−09 -0.007 -0.007 -0.000 -0.001 0.004 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ3−09 0.014** 0.010* 0.004 0.004 0.007 -0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004)
DDDQ4−09 0.016** 0.012** 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ1−10 0.005 0.006 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.004
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
DDDQ2−10 0.003 0.008 -0.005 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
No. Obs 305,590 305,590 305,590 305,590 305,590 305,590
R2 0.68 0.56 0.29 0.49 0.42 0.18
Wald 0.05 0.19 0.35 0.97 0.93 0.64
Year Specific Policy Effect
DDD2008 0.006 0.001 0.005* -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
DDD2009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
DDD2010 0.005 0.007 -0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
No. Obs 305,590 305,590 305,590 305,590 305,590
R2 0.68 0.56 0.29 0.48 0.41 0.18
Wald 0.46 0.51 0.26 0.60 0.48 0.42
Bootstrap standard errors with 1000 replications are in parenthesis (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Chapter 3
How Do Married Women Respond
When Their Husbands Lose Their
Jobs? Evidence from Turkey During
the Recent Crisis
3.1 Introduction
“Added worker effect” (AWE) has been extensively discussed in the literature to explain
the labor supply response of wives to their husbands’ unemployment by entering the labor
force (extensive margin) or increasing their working hours (intensive margin). This paper
empirically assesses the extensive margin of AWE for the period of the global economic
crisis of 2008 in Turkey. Turkey saw an approximately 3-percentage-point decrease in the
male employment rate between 2007 and 2009 associated with a proportional increase in
the female employment rate. The increase in the female employment rate was completely
attributable to married women, whereas the employment rate of single women remained
constant over the period. The goal of this paper is to analyze to what extent this opposite
movement of spousal labor supply is caused by AWE.
Identification of AWE is a challenging task given the potential endogenity problems
primarily arising from complementarity between leisures of spouses, assortative mating as
well as joint determination of spousal labor supply. The gender-segregated structure of
the Turkish labor market offers an ideal setting to empirically assess AWE: the 2008 crisis
provides a source of variation in the production level of male-dominated sectors that is
exogenous to married women’s participation behaviors. This variation in the output of
male-dominated sectors is used as an instrument for the husband’s unemployment after
removing the co-variation in the output of other sectors with higher female participation,
the variation attributed to individual characteristics and the variation in time trend.
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The first-stage estimation results suggest a strongly negative correlation between the
instrument and the husband’s displacement. This prevents us from worrying about the
weak instrument problem. The internal validity of the identification strategy sketched
above is supported by the fact that there is an unusual variation in the residuals predicted
from the output regression of the male-dominated sectors conditioning on all the controls.
In particular, this so-called “unpredicted” component of the male sectors’ production
exhibits a sudden, sharp slump with the outburst of the crisis, while having a smooth
trend for the rest of the period.
Panel data used for this analysis allows for controlling the time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity via individual fixed effects. The IV estimation results with fixed effects
suggest that a husband’s unemployment explains 54% to 64% of the observed increase
in the probability of his wife’s labor force participation. The magnitude of the estimate
depends on after how many quarters the wife responds to her husband’s displacement.
The effect starts to be seen after one quarter following his displacement, becomes the
largest two quarters after the husband became unemployed, while the effect dies out by
the fourth quarter of the displacement. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the
first attempt to explore the “causal” relation between a husband’s job loss and his wife’s
participation decision during the global recession in Turkey. Furthermore, it is the first
study that accounts for potential delays in the labor supply response of wives to their
husbands’ displacement.
Most of the literature relies on simple probit and tobit analyses depending on the
extensive or the intensive margin of AWE of their interest. Relatively few studies in
the literature address the potential endogeneity problems involved while assessing AWE1.
Some of these studies rely on a structural equation model, others rely on a non-linear
latent variable model (with fixed effects) grounded on a theoretical basis or an instrumen-
tal variable approach. This paper is methodologically closest to Goux et al. (2014) that
exploits an exogenous variation in spousal work hours induced by a regulation introducing
a shorter workweek in France in the late 1990s. In fact, Baslevent and Onaran (2003)
and Karaoglan and Okten (2012) explore the same issue using data from Turkey for the
years of 1988 versus 1994 and for the period of 2000-2012, respectively. While Baslevent
and Onaran address endogeneity by modeling spouses labor participation decision simul-
taneously, Karaoglan and Okten do not deal with the potential endogeneity problems. As
a consequence, their empirical findings differ substantially: the former study finds strong
evidence of AWE only for the crisis year of 1994 (in line with my results), on the con-
trary the latter observes the evidence of AWE for expansionary years. Both studies rely
on cross-sectional annual data, whereas this study utilizes a novel data set with a panel
design. Moreover, the empirical analysis adopted in this study is conducted on a quar-
1The leading studies are Blundell et al. (2012), Cullen and Gruber (2000), Goux et al.
(2014), Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and Maloney (1991).
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terly basis which allows for capturing the transitory response of a wife to a brief spell of
unemployment faced by her husband. This is unlikely to be captured by the early work
in Turkey using long-term measures of labor supply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical reasons why
AWE may or may not arise. Section 3.3 presents some stylized facts for Turkey. While
Section 3.4 introduces the data, Section 3.5 presents the identification strategy. Then
Section 3.6 provides the estimation results and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Theoretical grounds of AWE developed by Mincer (1962, 1966) and Long (1958) date back
to half a century ago. However, the first attempts at an empirical analysis of the AWE were
made after two decades, in the early 1980s, by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980, 1982) and
Layard et al. (1980). Currently there are a large number of empirical studies examining
AWE mostly from the U.S.. Empirical evidence for the existence of AWE is mixed even
within the same country. While some early work found small but significant AWE (in the
U.S. by Cullen and Gruber, 2000; Heckman and MaCurdy, 1980, 1982; Lundberg, 1985),
some others revealed no evidence of it (in the U.K. by Layard et al., 1980; in the U.S.
by Juhn and Murphy, 1997; Maloney, 1987, 1991). On the other hand, more recent work
has generally documented supporting evidence for AWE (in France by Goux et al., 2014;
in Japan by Kohara, 2009; in Turkey by Baslevent and Onaran, 2003; Karaoglan and
Okten, 2012; in the U.S. by Blundell et al., 2012; Mattingly and Smith, 2010; Spletzer,
1997; Stephens, 2002). Given the diversity of the findings in the previous literature, the
remainder of this section explains the channels why AWE may arise and why it may not
be empirically detected.
In a static model of household labor supply, a husband’s job loss might lead to an
increase in the labor supply of his wife in two ways. First, in order to compensate for the
transitory reduction in family income due to the husband’s unemployment, the nonpartic-
ipating wife would be more likely to enter the labor force, and similarly the participating
wife would be more willing to increase her working hours under the assumption that leisure
is a normal good (income effect). Secondly, the increased non-market time of the husband
would reduce the relative value of the wife’s non-market time and lower the opportunity
cost of her market work given the substitutability of the wife’s leisure with the husband’s
through home production (substitution effect). Replacement of the wife’s time in house-
hold activities with the husband’s non-market time would make the wife tend to work
more (Lundberg, 1985).
In a life-cycle model, on the other hand, the presence of liquidity constraints is re-
garded as the main motive to justify a transitory impact on the wife’s labor supply during
her husband’s unemployment spell. If families are liquidity-constrained or face fixed con-
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sumption commitments, they would be unable to smooth consumption over the husband’s
unemployment spell, hence the wife would tend to work more in order to compensate for
the reduction in the family income. Conversely, AWE should not arise in the absence of
any liquidity constraint: an effective unemployment insurance system along with a well-
functioning credit market would serve as an income compensation mechanism in the event
of an adverse income shock.
In the life cycle context, it is also important to consider whether the income loss is
anticipated or not. The fully anticipated income loss would not produce any income effect
on the present values of the wealth providing that there is no liquidity constraint2. In such
a scenario the only reason for the AWE to rise is the substitution effect which is expected
to be small as pointed out by the previous research (Lundberg, 1985). On the other hand,
an unanticipated income loss is likely to give rise to an AWE regardless of the presence of
liquidity constraint. The uncertainty could also appear with regard to the timing of job
offers and accordingly the duration of the unemployment spell.
It may be difficult to detect AWE in empirical studies because of three main issues:
a complementarity between leisures of spouses, assortative mating3 and the dominance of
discouraged worker effect. There may be a positive and high correlation in unobserved
tastes for leisure among wives and husbands in the same household (for instance, spouses
enjoy spending time together). If husbands with a higher taste for leisure also have a
higher probability of losing their job, then the AWE may not be detected (Maloney, 1991).
Assortative mating in tastes for work between wives and husbands might bias against
finding an AWE, especially if the analysis relies on a cross-section of data (Cullen and
Gruber, 2000). In other words, if there is assortative mating, then women whose husbands
are more likely to be unemployed would be less likely to be employed. Given the negative
correlation between the husband’s unemployment and the wife’s market wage among the
assortative-mated couples, wives with frequently unemployed husbands would be less likely
to compensate for the income loss because of the unusually low wage rates they both face
in the labor market. Lastly, given that spouses are subject to the same macroeconomic
conditions, the economic downturn that caused the husband’s unemployment may directly
reduce the wife’s employment propensity through a reduction in her shadow wage although
she may wish to increase her labor supply in response to her husband’s unemployment. In
this case, the so-called “discouraged worker effect” would dominate the AWE (Lundberg,
1985; Maloney, 1991).
2One may argue that income effect could still appear in a scenario of a fully-anticipated
job loss through labor supply response to the anticipation of the unemployment rather
than the realized unemployment. This issue is difficult to investigate empirically with the
available data and is left for further research
3Assortative mating means that individuals with similar phenotypes (observable char-
acteristics) mate with one another more frequently.
75
3.3 Stylized Facts
This section aims to provide some descriptive statistics for Turkey to motivate the identi-
fication strategy. First of all, it characterizes the gender segregation in the labor market
for the pre-crisis period. Then, it discusses how the gender gap in employment has evolved
during the crisis, which in fact constitutes the motivation of this paper. Lastly, the du-
ality in the labor market is discussed with a special focus on the sectoral distribution of
employment. It particularly examines the output and employment changes in the male-
versus female-sectors throughout the crisis period. These features of the Turkish labor
market are at the core of the identification strategy illustrated in the next section.
The Turkish labor market exhibits a fully segmented structure from the gender per-
spective. Many researchers from Turkey point out the significant role of the cultural factors
in the society in explaining the dramatically low rate of female labor force participation
(Aran et al., 2010; Dayioglu and Kirdar, 2009; Gunduz-Hosgor and Smith, 2006). As Table
3.1 displays, while 34.4% of single women were participating in the labor force in 2007, the
participation rate was only 21.6% for married women. The increasing responsibilities of
women related to household chores after marriage make them, particularly those in urban
areas, withdraw from the labor market. Aran et al. (2010) report that only one fifth of the
poorly educated urban women continue working after having the first child. Although they
have a higher educational attainment, the participation rate of urban women decreases
by a 15 percentage point upon the first baby’s birth, and does not reach its earlier level.
On the other hand, men who were not working before the marriage enter the labor force
to afford their (new) families’ living expenses. Consistent with this argument, labor force
participation among married men is much higher relative to their single counterparts, as
presented in Table 3.1.
The gender-segregated structure of the Turkish labor market has exhibited an unusual
pattern during the recent economic crisis. Table 3.1 reveals that the average unemployment
rate reached unprecedented figures, increasing to 14% in 2009 from 10.3% in 2007. Both
men and women suffered from the increase in unemployment rate during the crisis, whereas
the rates of labor force participation and employment showed different patterns across
genders. The most distinctive difference was observed among married people. The labor
force participation rate among married women which was around 22% before the crisis rose
to 25.3% in 2009. Married men, on the other hand, being more likely to be attached to the
labor market had a constant participation rate of about 76% over the period. Likewise,
an almost 3 percentage-point increase was observed in the employment rate among the
married women between 2007 and 2009. This was associated with a proportional decrease
in the employment rate of married men. This opposite movement among married people
constitutes the main motivation of this paper.
The duality in the labor market can also be observed in the sectoral distribution of
employment. There are some sectors dominated by male labor force such as manufactur-
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ing, construction, wholesale and retail trade, and transport, storage and communication
services in which the proportion of female labor force fluctuates no more than 15% (see
Figure 3.1). An inspection of Figure 3.2 makes clear that these male-dominated sectors are
the ones hit hardest by the recent economic crisis in terms of output losses. On the other
hand, there are some sectors such as education, health and social work related services
where female labor force is relatively higher (above the average female employment rate).
In these sectors the production levels were barely affected by the crisis.
In parallel to the output losses during the crisis, manufacturing and construction,
followed by trade and transportation services, saw the severest decline in the employment
rate between 2008 and 2009. On the other hand, the employment rate in the other sectors
where female labor force is relatively higher did not show a considerable change during the
period (see Figure 3.3)4. The overall change in the employment rate of the male- versus
the female- sectors can be seen in Figure 3.4.
In fact, the employment outcomes in the male sectors were adversely affected by the
crisis for both married and single people. As can be seen in the upper panel of Figure 3.5,
the deterioration in the employment rate among the married is attributable to husbands
rather than wives. On the other hand, the employment rate in the female sectors increased
among married people during the crisis. In line with the AWE hypothesis, this increase is
due to the upturn in the trend of married women by 2008, whereas the employment rate
among married men in those sectors showed a constant trend thereafter.
3.4 Data
The main data come from the 2007-2010 panel of the “Survey on Income and Living Con-
ditions (SILC)” which has been conducted by the Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat)
since 2006. The survey provides detailed information on demographic characteristics such
as age, education and marital status, labor force characteristics such as current employ-
ment status, working hours, job characteristics, past work information, reason for job
change, labor and other income, household characteristics and living conditions.
SILC is the first attempt in Turkey in consideration of its panel structure, which allows
for tracing the same individuals in the working age population over the period. The rich
set of data on labor market characteristics, as well as its panel design, make SILC unique
and invaluable for analyzing the AWE in the Turkish context. The previous literature has
generally addressed the inability of cross-sectional data to uncover the true estimate of
AWE (e.g. Cullen and Gruber, 2000). An obvious shortcoming of the cross-sectional data
is that they cannot adequately capture the inter-temporal decisions of wives to enter the
4For the sake of brevity, the male-dominated sectors and the other sectors where fe-
male participation is relatively higher will henceforth be called male- and female- sectors,
respectively.
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labor force in response to the unemployment of their husbands (Spletzer, 1997). To the
best of my knowledge, this study is the first attempt to estimate the AWE in Turkey by
using longitudinal data.
Although SILC is designed on a yearly basis, the monthly information related to the
labor market status of individuals enables us to conduct a short-run analysis of the AWE
by constructing a quarterly measure of labor supply. Thus, this study is able to dispense
with the concerns addressed by Lundberg (1985) and Spletzer (1997) about the inability
of the annual measures of labor supply in capturing the transitory response to a brief spell
of unemployment faced by the husband. The previous studies in Turkey, on the other
hand, relying on the annual measures are not able to capture the short-run AWE .
The identification strategy exploited in this paper relies on an exogenous variation in
sectoral output induced by the crisis of 2008. The final data set for the empirical analysis
is thus built by complementing SILC with additional information on sectoral output that
comes from the “Survey on National Accounts”. These two data sets are merged based
on the information of the survey period5.
The specific question addressed in this paper is well-defined only for married couples.
Thus, the resulting panel sample is restricted to only (married) couples who do not change
their marital status or their partners over the sample period, and those who divorce, be-
come widowed or change their partners are excluded from the sample. Since the paper
focuses specifically on the extensive margin of AWE, the initial sample is composed of
nonparticipating wives married with working men. In this sample, the empirical coun-
terpart of AWE is the difference between the probability of entering in the labor force
among nonparticipating wives whose husbands become unemployed in a following period
and the same probability among those whose husbands remain employed. To avoid the
potential endogenity problems to be discussed in the following section, the sample is fur-
ther restricted for the regression analysis in a way to include only involuntary separations
that occurred within the crisis period.
Table 3.2 displays how the labor market outcomes of the individuals evolve across
the years by the labor market status of their spouses. The general pattern observed
across years is that wives are more likely to be labor force participants if their husbands
are employed. When the participation rates of wives are examined conditional on the
employment status of their husbands, the relevant percentages are 28.1% versus 2.6% in
2008 and 28.3% versus 3.2% in 2009. The most common type of mating is nonparticipating
wives with working husbands which represent the initial sample of the regression analysis.
Their share in the full sample of couples fell from 53.1% in 2008 to 51.3% in 2009. On the
other hand, the incidence of the least likely case, participating wives with non-employed
husbands, increased from 2.6% in 2008 to 3.2% in 2009.
The descriptive statistics presented so far are consistent with the presence of AWE.
5Further information on the data sources is presented in Appendix 3.A.1.
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However, a more elaborate analysis is required to give a causal interpretation of such
correlations. The next section illustrates the approach considered in this paper.
3.5 Identification Strategy
In order to estimate the labor supply response of wives to their husbands’ job losses,
the analysis starts with a regression of the wife’s labor force participation on husband’s
unemployment:
Yift = α+ βDift +X
′
iftΩ + ift (3.1)
where: Yift is a binary variable indicating participation status of the nonparticipating wife
i of couple f which is equal to 1 if she enters in the labor force at time t and 0 if she
stays inactive6; Dift is a binary variable indicating displacement status of the husband i
of couple f which is equal to 1 if he loses his job at time t and 0 if he stays in employment;
Xift is a vector of individual covariates including age, educational attainment, past work
experience of wives and husbands; number of children aged up to 5 years and aged between
6 and 14 years. The covariates of past work experience are of particular importance in
order to control for permanent unobserved characteristics such as the wife’s propensity to
work and the husband’s unemployment incidence over the life cycle (Spletzer, 1997). The
covariates also include the presence of other adults in the household that do not work. As
they can take care of the children or help in household chores, I expect them to have an
explanatory power in the participation decision of the wife.
β is the parameter of interest in the regression function in equation (3.1). The critical
question is whether the (OLS) estimate of β can be interpreted as AWE. One concern is the
endogeneity problem arising from voluntary unemployment of the husband. As pointed
out by the early work, the more likely the wife increases her labor supply, the more easily
the husband may choose to resign from his job (Kohara, 2009). To rule out such a problem,
the sample is restricted to “involuntary separations” by excluding resignations. However,
the husband’s unemployment could still be endogenous in the labor supply decision of his
wife, unless it is unexpected. If the family anticipates the job loss, the wife may adjust her
labor supply according to their expectancy before the displacement. Since the interest is to
analyze the wife’s labor supply response to the realized unemployment of her husband, the
anticipated job losses have to be excluded. Therefore, only job losses that occurred during
the period of the recent global crisis are included in the analysis, assuming that the crisis
is unexpected. One may argue that an involuntary job loss, even if it is unanticipated,
would not be exogenous if those who are dismissed from their jobs are the less productive
6Labor force participation includes both employed and unemployed persons. The latter
is composed of people who are not working but actively seeking a job. Thus, entering in
the labor force refers to those who are involved in job search, which is explicitly asked to
the respondents in the survey.
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workers. This would not be an issue if the sample could have been restricted to the lay-offs
due to plant closings, however, the data limitation does not enable us to do so. To deal
with this problem, the past work experience of the husband is included in the regression as
a covariate which could be regarded as a proxy for the tendency towards being displaced
due to some permanent unobserved characteristics such as his productivity.
The final, yet important source of bias in the OLS estimate of β is the simultaneity in
labor supply behaviors of spouses. One possible way to deal with this endogeneity problem
is implementing an IV estimator. The 2008 crisis provides an exogenous variation in the
production level of male-dominated sectors that is exploited to instrument the husband’s
displacement. In particular, the instrument is constructed based on the variation in the
production level of the male-dominated sectors induced by the crisis net of the variation
in the production level of other sectors with higher female participation, net of individual
characteristics, particularly of their past work experiences and net of the deterministic
trend. As will be discussed in the following section, the instrument has a negative and
strong correlation with the husband’s displacement. This prevents us from worrying about
the weak instrument problem.
Equation (3.2) presents the first-stage regression:
Dift = α0 + α1Zst + α2Fst + α3T +X
′
iftΩ + εift (3.2)
where: Dift is the dummy variable for the husband’s unemployment as described in equa-
tion (3.1); the variable Zst indicates the output of sectors s in which men dominate, and
the variable Fst indicates the output of sectors s with higher female participation. One
may be concerned about the crisis effects going beyond the male-dominated sectors. It is
likely that the recession has led to a general worsening of macro-economic conditions which
might have a direct effect on female participation decision. The variable F is included in
the regression to rule out such a potential endogeneity problem. The variable T indicates
a reference time period running through the set of {1, 2, ..., 6} which is identified with the
set of {(2008, quarter3), (2008, quarter4), ..., (2009, quarter4)}, where T = 1 corresponds
to (2008, quarter3), T = 2 corresponds to (2008, quarter4), and so forth. Including the
time variable allows to control for the deterministic trend in the sectors of interest. The
vector X includes the same control variables previously considered in equation (3.1).
The main identifying assumption of this empirical analysis is that the only link between
the output changes in the husband’s sector and the wife’s participation decision is the
husband’s displacement. Two key observations corroborate this assumption. First, there
is a full gender segregation in the sectoral distribution of employment, and the sectors
which men dominate in are the ones the crisis hit hardest, while the sectors with a higher
female labor force were not affected by the crisis, as discussed in Section 3.3 (see Figures
3.1-3.2). Thus the changes in the production level of the male-dominated sectors are not
expected to have a direct effect on the female participation decision, as long as the output
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change in the other sectors with higher female participation is controlled. As mentioned
above, this covariate captures the general worsening of macro-economic conditions due to
the recession.
The second observation supporting the internal validity is represented by Figure 3.6.
The instrumental variable proposed for this analysis has to be interpreted as the “un-
predicted” component of the male sectors’ production: identification exploits the output
variation in the male sectors that is left after removing the co-variation with the pro-
duction in the female sectors, the variability attributed to individual characteristics and
the variability in time trend. If this “unpredicted” component is exogenous to the hus-
band’s displacement, it should exhibit an unusual fluctuation during the crisis and rather
a smooth trend for the rest of the period. I check this argument by considering the pattern
of the output of the male- and female- sectors. I consider equation (3.3) and (3.4) below.
Zst = γ1,0 + γ1,1T +X
′
iftΩ1 + υ1,ift (3.3)
Fst = γ2,0 + γ2,1T +X
′
iftΩ2 + υ2,ift (3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) present the regressions of the output of the male- and female-
sectors respectively, conditioning on individual characteristics (X) and time trend (T ).
Figure 3.6 plots the residuals from equations (3.3) and (3.4) which are denoted by a
dashed blue line and a dotted green line, respectively. It also plots the difference between
the two residuals which is denoted by a solid red line. This difference has a stable and a
smooth trend till the onset of the crisis, exhibits a sudden fall with the outburst of the
crisis after the third quarter of 2008, and then it levels out. The slump observed between
the third and fourth quarters of 2008 is unusual to the overall trend. In other words, the
largest source of variation in the “unpredicted” component comes from the 2008 shock and
the output fall in this period was largely unexpected. This is a supporting evidence for
the unanticipated change in the output of the male-dominated sectors, which is exogenous
to the husband’s displacement.
3.6 Results
This section presents the estimation results of the effect of the husband’s displacement on
the wife’s participation decision based on different specifications. It is reasonable to expect
a potential delay in the labor supply response of the wife to her husband’s unemployment.
As a matter of fact, it may take time for the wife to adjust her labor supply in response
to her husband’s job loss. To take into account possible delays in the wife’s response,
six separate regressions are estimated each of which belongs to a different delay period
ranging from zero to five quarters. Table 3.3 presents estimation results of each regression
in a different column. For instance, the first column reports the change in the probability
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of entering in the labor force of a nonparticipating wife in the quarter when her husband
has become unemployed, while the last column indicates how the same probability changes
five quarters after the husband’s displacement.
The main estimator of this analysis is the IV estimator as described in the previous
section. To benchmark the IV results, the tables also display the OLS estimates of the
parameter β in equation (3.1). A threat to identification could be an omitted variables
problem if other (unobserved) factors that affect a wife’s participation decision are also
correlated with the output shock. To mitigate this potential problem the specification is
extended in a way to include individual fixed-effects. The results in Table 3.3 are reported
both with and without individual fixed effects. According to the OLS estimates reported
in the top panel of Table 3.3, the labor force participation decision of married women
has generally a positive association with their husbands’ unemployment throughout the
delay periods. When individual fixed effects are included in the regression equation, the
signs of the coefficient estimates remain the same, as presented in the bottom panel of
the table. However, most of the estimates become statistically insignificant (or borderline
significant) as the coefficients become smaller -more negative-, and the standard errors
become larger7. OLS estimates -with and without fixed effects- are relatively small in
magnitude and sometimes of the unexpected sign. They are likely to be biased toward
zero due to the attenuation bias and thus lead to less positive coefficients. All in all, OLS
estimates do not provide support to the presence of AWE8.
Given this, we now turn to the results based on the IV strategy illustrated in section
3.5 of the paper. The IV approach generates uniformly larger estimates for the parameter
β than the OLS estimates. One possible explanation for the sizable difference between
IV and OLS estimates is that measurement error in the treatment might bias the OLS
estimates downwards. Another explanation common in the IV literature is that the IV
estimate identifies a local average treatment effect parameter and that the group of com-
pliers particularly benefits from the treatment. This might be the reason why a larger
effect is estimated through IV.
Including fixed effects in the estimation makes a substantial difference within the IV
results. While the signs are consistent, the magnitudes of the estimates are lower in
fixed effects estimation, generally with larger standard errors. When unobserved (time-
invariant) heterogeneity is controlled via fixed effects, the estimated effects are smaller, as
can be seen in Table 3.3. The discussion that follows focuses on the IV results with fixed
7Larger standard errors in fixed effects estimation indicate a great variation in the
predictor variables across individuals despite a little variation over time for each individual.
An outcome would be less precise estimates even if the magnitudes of the coefficients are
the same.
8The endogenity test of the endogenous regressor (husband’s displacement) has a p-
value of 0.000 for all specifications suggesting that my sample data overwhelmingly rejects
the use of OLS in favor of IV.
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effects.
The first stage estimation results indicate a sizable, negative and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between the husband’s displacement and the corresponding instrumental
variable for every delay period (see the bottom panel of Table 3.3). As the sectoral output
declines, the probability of being displaced for a husband increases. To illustrate, the
entry in the third column of Table 3.3 indicates that a 10 percentage point fall in the
production level is associated with a 1.2 percentage point increase in the probability of
being displaced for a husband working in certain sectors. The F-statistics of the instru-
ment are above 10 for most of the specifications and consequently do not suffer from a
weak instrument problem (Staiger and Stock, 1997).
The IV results with fixed effects suggest that husbands’ unemployment accounts for
54% to 64% of the observed increase in the probability of their wives’ labor force participa-
tion during the crisis in Turkey. The magnitude of the estimate depends on after how many
quarters wives respond to their husbands’ displacement. The effect has a reverted U-shape
distribution: it emerges after one quarter following the husband’s unemployment, becomes
the greatest in the second quarter after the job loss and phases out by the fourth quarter of
the unemployment. The estimates are consistent with the following interpretation: women
waited four to twelve months to enter the labor force probably until they became sure that
their husbands were unlikely to find a job. As the economic recovery started by the end
of 2009, accordingly as men have regained their comparative advantageous over women
in the labor market, the labor supply response of the wives has disappeared. Recalling
the discussions in Section 3.2, the evidence supporting the existence of the AWE can be
interpreted as follows: the income and substitution effect prevail over complementarity in
leisures of spouses during the crisis period in Turkey.
One discernible point in Table 3.3 is the steady decline in the number of observations
as going from zero to five quarters of delay. It is because the lagged variables (of husband’s
displacement) are constructed with respect to the previous quarter, starting from the third
quarter of 2008. To keep the sample size fixed in order not to lose information over the delay
periods, the lagged variables of the displacement are constructed from the beginning by
relying on data before the third quarter of 2008. In this new sample not only the job losses
that occurred during the crisis but also those before the crisis are included. Accordingly,
the association between the instrument and the husband’s displacement loosens given that
the instrument is constructed based on the variation in the sectoral output induced by the
crisis (see appendix Table 3.B.1.). A more detailed discussion is presented in Appendix
3.A.2.
Aside from the key independent variable, all of the regressions include several other
independent variables though not presented in Table 3.3. The independent variables that
are essential to construct the instrumental variable are the output of other sectors with a
higher female participation and the time trend. While the former enables the control for
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the general worsening of macro-economic conditions which are likely to have a direct effect
on married women’s participation decisions, the latter variable allows for capturing the
deterministic trend. Other control variables are those that are likely to have explanatory
power for married women’s participation decision. Personal characteristics utilized in the
regression analysis are the ages of the husband and wife (included quadratically), their
years of schooling, their past work experiences, the number of children they have in the
0-5 and 6-14 age groups and the number of other adults in the household that do not
work. For the sake of brevity, Table 3.4 presents estimates of the coefficients of control
variables just for one specification, namely the 2-quarter delay period, since they are very
stable across different specifications.
The magnitudes and the signs of the coefficients are generally consistent with expec-
tations. As displayed in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.4, the years of schooling of the
wife have a strongly positive effect on her participation. So do the husband’s years of
schooling on her participation, but with a smaller size. His educational attainment has a
statistically significant, negative but a small effect on his displacement. The older a wife
is, the more likely she is to enter the labor force. Her participation probability peaks at
around the age of 35. On the other hand, the probability of the husband’s unemployment
decreases with his age after 25 years old. Both the husband’s and the wife’s past work
experience have a positive effect on the wife’s participation, but the estimated effects are
very small. On the other hand, there is a fairly large and negative association between
the past work experience of the husband and his displacement.
In line with the findings from the earlier literature, having more children younger than
6 years old decreases the probability of their mother’s participation in the labor force,
whereas the number of children aged 6 to 14 has no significant effect on the participation
of women. This may have to do with the independence of those children from a special
parental care. In contrast to expectations, the number of other adults in household is
found to have a negative effect on the wife’s participation decision though the estimates
are only borderline significant. This could be because these elderly people are in need of
special care and wives are the potential caregivers. The coefficient estimates of the control
variables become statistically insignificant when individual fixed effects are included in the
estimation due to the larger standard errors, probably because there is little variability
of these controls over time, i.e. across quarters, within individual in the relatively short
period (2008-2009) considered in this analysis. Time-invariant controls coefficients cannot
be identified within the fixed-effect approach.
3.6.1 Heterogenity in the Added Worker Effect
The analysis of the AWE has so far focused on couples aged between 15 and 64. However,
it is likely that older wives close to the age of retirement postpone their labor supply
responses. If this argument is true, then restricting the sample to a younger age group
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would yield a stronger AWE. Eligibility for retirement in Turkey depends on the gender,
age and service duration.9 The sample is restricted to women aged 15 to 50 to exclude
women potentially close to being eligible for retirement. This restricted sample accounts for
77% of the total sample size. The analysis performed in the previous section is replicated
for this younger age group to check whether the results are robust to the changes in the
ages of spouses.
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results for the restricted samples. Comparing the
bottom panel of Table 3.3 with the top panel of Table 3.5 indicates that the AWE is
uniformly stronger for the younger age cohort in all delay periods in line with expectations.
As for the older cohort (aged 51-64 year), no strong correlation is found in the first stage of
the estimation given that estimates are less precise and most coefficients are only significant
at 10%. This could be due to the fact that employers prefer not to fire older workers during
an economic contraction to avoid incurring in higher firing costs: older workers are more
likely to have longer service duration and hence a higher severance pay.
Next, heterogeneity in AWE is explored along an additional dimension, namely ed-
ucation. Indeed, it is reasonable to expect that low-educated people are more likely to
be subject to a tighter liquidity constraint under the assumption of a positive correlation
between educational level and earnings (savings). Therefore, the expectation is towards
finding a stronger AWE among the low-educated couples. Table 3.5 presents the estima-
tion results for the couples with low-educated husbands. Consistent with the expectation,
the AWE estimated for the full sample of couples (presented in Table 3.3) is entirely at-
tributable to these low-educated couples. Quite similar results are found if the sample
is further restricted in such a way that both husbands and wives are low-educated (see
appendix Table 3.B.2.)10. This is a symptom for a stronger AWE among couples with
high homogamy in education. Considering high homogamy in education as an indicator of
assortative mating, this result can be interpreted as follows: assortative mating does not
play an obscuring role in detecting AWE in my sample. However, one must be cautious in
relying on this interpretation as the AWE hypothesis cannot be tested when both spouses
9The minimum age for retirement was first regulated in 1999, but since then has un-
dergone many changes over years (Law No. 4759, 2002; Law No 5510, 2006). Before the
regulation, women and men were qualified to be retired regardless of their age provided
that they have 20 and 25 years of service, respectively. The age limit, which is currently
a minimum of 58 for women and 60 for men, has gradually been pushed up for those who
had a certain duration of service at the time the law was enacted.
10This is have to do with the small difference between the samples used in Table 3.5
and Table 3.B.2. The largest component of the estimation sample is represented by the
low-educated husbands married with low-educated women, that accounts for 66.5% of
the whole sample. Table 3.B.2 relies on this subsample. Table 3.5, on the other hand,
relies on couples with low-educated husbands, thus including high-educated wives married
with low-educated men (which only account for 3.6% of the sample) in addition to the
subsample used by Table 3.B.2.
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have high level of education since the first stage of the estimation does not work for the
couples with high-educated husbands (see the bottom panel of Table 3.5). This could be
because high-educated men are less likely to lose their jobs due to the crisis.
3.7 Conclusion
The debate on labor supply response of married women to their husbands’ job losses
(added worker effect) has escalated with the outburst of the global economic crisis of
2008. This paper contributes to the current debate through an empirical analysis of the
added worker effect for the crisis period by relying on a case study on Turkey. To rule out
the potential endogeneity problems, especially the simultaneity in spouses’ labor supply
decisions, in estimating the effect of husbands’ unemployment on wives’ participation
decisions, this paper exploits an exogenous variation in the output level of male-dominated
sectors induced by the 2008 crisis as an instrument for the husband’s job loss and the
gender-segmented structure of the Turkish labor market. This study examines for the first
time added worker effect over the recent crisis period in Turkey using longitudinal data.
When the (time-invariant) unobserved heterogeneity is controlled via fixed effects, the
instrumental variable estimates indicate that husbands’ unemployment accounts for 54%
to 64% of the observed increase in the probability of their wives’ labor force participation
The magnitude of the estimate depends on after how many quarters the wife responds
to her husband’s displacement. The effect has emerged after one quarter following the
husband’s unemployment, become the greatest in the second quarter after the job loss and
phased out after the fourth quarter of the unemployment. This implies that wives waited
for entering the labor market at least one quarter, until they lost their hope about their
husbands’ finding a job. As the economic recovery started, the husbands again became
more likely to be hired and the wives’ responses disappeared. The AWE is even stronger
when the sample is restricted to a younger age cohort who are far from being retired.
The largest effect is found among the spouses who are both low-educated. This implies
the importance of liquidity constraints among the low-educated couples in the decision of
labor force participation.
The evidence for the presence of AWE is consistent with the following interpretation:
the income and substitution effect prevail over the complementarity in leisures of spouses
for the crisis period in Turkey. The results furthermore indicate that the discouraged
worker effect did not obscure the labor supply response of wives. The dominance of the
added worker effect could have brought about a change in favor of female employment
trends over the crisis. However, what we know from Turkey’s past crisis experiences is
that the increase in female participation during the recession is likely to be temporary
(Baslevent and Onaran, 2003). Demand side improvements are rather more likely to lead
to a permanent increase in womens participation.
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Appendix
3.A.1. More about the Data Sets
Survey on Income and Living Conditions is designed as a rotating panel in which
the sample of households and corresponding individuals are traced annually for four con-
secutive years. The interviews are administered once a year. Every year the survey is
conducted for four subsamples. One quarter of the sample is replaced by a new one in
each year, thus three fourths of the sample remains unchanged with respect to the pre-
vious year. The samples are selected and assigned survey weights so as to be nationally
representative. Moreover, the sample size is designed considering possible non-responses,
thereby no replacement is undertaken.
On the other hand, the Survey on National Accounts records the output levels,
namely gross domestic product by kinds of economic activity at constant (1998) prices.
The economic activities are classified into 17 sub-sectors, namely Agriculture, Hunting
and Forestry; Fishing; Mining and Quarrying; Manufacturing; Electricity, Gas and Water
Supply; Construction; Wholesale and Retail Trade; Hotels and Restaurants; Transport,
storage and Communication; Financial Intermediation; Ownership and Dwelling; Real
Estate, Renting and Business Activities; Public Administration and Defense, and Com-
pulsory Social Security; Education; Health and Social Work; Other Community, Social
and Personal Service activities and Private Housekeeping Services.
For the specific aim of the empirical analysis, some sub-sectors are aggregated into two
groups based on some specific characteristics. The first group includes the male-dominated
sectors which were hit severely by the crisis (manufacturing; construction; wholesale and
retail trade; and transport, storage and communication services), whereas the second group
involves the sectors with higher female participation (education; health and social work;
other community, social and personal service activities and private housekeeping services).
These two groups of sectors totally account for 74% of non-agricultural GDP and 85% of
non-agricultural employment.
3.A.2. Falsification Exercise using Fixed Sample Size
The number of observations used for the regression analysis changes across the delay peri-
ods, as can be seen in Table 3.3. It is due to the fact that the lagged variables (of husband’s
displacement) are constructed with respect to the previous quarter, starting from the third
quarter of 2008. While there is no missing value in the variable of displacement, there is
one missing value in the first lag of the variable, two missing values in the second lag of
the variable, three missing values in the third lag of the variable and so forth. The lagged
variables are constructed in the following way.
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
2008Q3 1 . . . . .
2008Q4 0 1 . . . .
2009Q1 0 0 1 . . .
2009Q2 1 0 0 1 . .
2009Q3 0 1 0 0 1 .
2009Q4 0 0 1 0 0 1
where: Dq for q ∈ (0, ..., 5) denotes the variable of husband’s displacement with a lag of 0
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to 5 quarters. The sample period is the crisis period, ranging between the third quarter
of 2008 (2008Q3) and the fourth quarter of 2009 (2009Q4).
One discernible point in Table 3.3 is that the difference in the number of observations
between two consecutive delay periods is not equal. The most striking is the difference
between “no delay” and “1-quarter delay” periods versus the difference between other con-
secutive delay periods. It may have to do with the presence of missing values in the control
variables, differentiating between years. Think of a control variable fully observed in 2008,
but having missing values in 2009 for some individuals. The number of observations for
the first two specifications (i.e. no delay and 1-quarter delay) would be much closer to
each other given that the zero- and the first-lag of the variable involve information from
both 2008 and 2009. However, the other specifications can utilize information only from
2009 which is missing for some individuals. Therefore, the difference in the number of
observations between “no delay” and “1-quarter delay” period is the smallest, whereas it
is larger and more equal thereafter.
To avoid information loss across the specifications, a new sample is created by keeping
the sample size fixed over the delay periods. To this end, the lagged variables of the dis-
placement are constructed from the beginning by relying on data before the third quarter
of 2008 (which is before the outburst of the crisis). The way of constructing the lagged
variables in the new sample is demonstrated in the matrix below. The sample period of
interest is still the crisis period, namely the area within the rectangular frame. To illus-
trate, as for the survey period of the third quarter of 2008, the first lag of the variable is
constructed exploiting the information from the second quarter of 2008, the second lag is
constructed based on the information from the first quarter of 2008, and so forth. In doing
so, the missing values in the matrix above (drawn for the original sample) are completed
by exploiting the information prior to the crisis, which enables a fixed sample size over the
delay periods. In this new sample, the focus is on not only the job losses that occurred
during the crisis, but also those before the crisis.
D0 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
2007Q2 0
. . . · · · · · · · · · · · ·
2007Q3 1 0
. . .
...
2007Q4 0 1 0
. . .
...
2008Q1 0 0 1 0
. . .
...
2008Q2 0 0 0 1 0
. . .
2008Q3 1 0 0 0 1 0
2008Q4 0 1 0 0 0 1
2009Q1 0 0 1 0 0 0
2009Q2 1 0 0 1 0 0
2009Q3 0 1 0 0 1 0
2009Q4 0 0 1 0 0 1
Recall that it is the crisis that provides the exogenous variation in the production
level of some specific sectors, and this variation is exploited as an instrument for the
husband’s displacement. When displacements that occurred before the crisis are added to
the sample, naturally the association between the output change in those specific sectors
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and the displacement loosens. To express this in technical terms, the coefficient estimates
in the first stage are no longer strongly statistically significant in this new sample (see
appendix Table 3.B.1). This falsification exercise provides a sense of plausibility of my
identification assumption with the following reasoning inspired by Angrist and Pischke
(2009: 97). If the only reason for the instrument effects on the wife’s participation is the
husband’s displacement, then the instrument effects on the wife’s participation should be
zero in samples where the instrument is unrelated to the endogenous regressor.
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3.B. Appendix Tables
Table 3.B.1. Falsification exercise using fixed sample size
(including fixed effects)
No 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 5-quarter
delay delay delay delay delay delay
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.083** -0.079** -0.094** -0.075* -0.072* -0.103
(0.037) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.081)
F test 5.01 3.81 5.78 3.52 2.26 0.92
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.526 0.598* 0.660** 0.597* 0.505 1.325
(1.366) (0.289) (0.272) (0.262) (0.312) (1.384)
No. observations 20,427 20,427 20,427 20,427 20,427 20,427
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.018 0.010 0.024 0.005 -0.020* -0.013
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
No. observations 20,429 20,429 20,429 20,429 20,429 20,429
1 Controls: age, age-square and past work experience of wives and husbands, number of children (aged
up to 5 and between 6-14) and number of other adults in the household.
2 Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at quarter-year level (***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
Table 3.B.2. Homogamy in education:
Both spouses educated below high school
(including fixed effects)
No 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 5-quarter
delay delay delay delay delay delay
First Stage
Male sectors’ output 0.124*** -0.135*** -0.186*** -0.134*** -0.139*** -0.298***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.047) (0.048) (0.053) (0.107)
F test 10.35 10.20 9.77 7.92 6.03 7.79
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.471 0.619** 0.659** 0.655** 0.691* 0.816
(1.094) (0.315) (0.314) (0.316) (0.385) (0.517)
No. observations 20,449 19,315 17,779 16,599 15,379 14,194
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.012 0.019 0.012 0.009 -0.019 -0.012
(0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015)
No. observations 20,479 19,337 17,996 16,641 15,408 14,218
1 Controls: age, age-square and past work experience of wives and husbands, number of children (aged
up to 5 and between 6-14) and number of other adults in the household.
2 Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at quarter-year level (***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Sectoral distribution of employment by gender, 2007
(as a share of total employment in the corresponding sector)
   Source : Turkstat, 2013. 
Note :  The sectors in sequence are Construction; Transport, Storage and Communication; Wholesale and 
Retail Trade;   Manufacturing; Social Services; Education Services; Health and Social Work. 
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Figure 3.2: Sectoral output over the crisis period
(gross domestic product in constant prices)
  Source : Turkstat, 2013. 
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Figure 3.3: Employment rate by sectors over the crisis period
(as a share of population aged 15-64)
     Source : Author's own calculations based on micro data from Turkstat.
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Figure 3.4: Employment rate by sectoral groups over the crisis
(as a share of population aged 15-64)
       Source : Author's own calculations based on micro data from Turkstat.
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Figure 3.5: Employment rate in sectoral groups by marital status
(as a share of population aged 15-64 in the corresponding marital & gender group)
            Source : Author's own calculations based on micro data from Turkstat.
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Figure 3.6: Internal Validity
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Note: The dashed line represents the predicted residual from the regression of male sectors’ output. The
dotted line represents the predicted residual from the regression of female sectors’ output. The solid line
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Tables
Table 3.1: Labor market indicators by gender and marital status
2007 2008 2009 2010
Labor Force Participation Rate 46.2 46.9 47.9 48.8
of which: Female 23.6 24.5 27.0 27.6
               of which: Single 34.4 35.3 35.8 36.0
                                 Married 21.6 22.4 25.3 26.4
of which: Male 69.8 70.1 70.5 70.8
               of which: Single 57.7 58.3 58.5 59.2
                                 Married 75.9 76.2 76.0 77.0
Employment Rate 41.5 41.7 41.2 43.0
of which: Female 21.0 21.6 23.9 25.0
               of which: Single 27.6 28.2 27.6 28.3
                                 Married 20.3 20.9 23.1 24.2
of which: Male 62.7 62.6 59.7 61.7
               of which: Single 46.6 46.8 44.8 47.0
                                 Married 70.6 70.3 67.7 70.7
Unemployment Rate 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9
of which: Female 11.0 11.6 13.3 13.0
               of which: Single 19.8 20.0 23.9 22.6
                                 Married 6.0 7.0 9.1 8.2
of which: Male 10.0 10.7 14.9 11.4
               of which: Single 19.2 19.8 24.7 20.6
                                 Married 7.0 7.8 11.2 9.2
Source : Turkstat, 2013. 
Table 3.2: Labor market outcomes by spouses’ labor market status
2008 2009
Husband Husband All Husband Husband All
employed nonemployed employed nonemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wife 1981 186 2167 2100 228 2238
participating (28.1) (2.6) (30.7) (28.3) (3.2) (31.5)
Wife 3744 1140 4884 3645 1224 4869
nonparticipating (53.1) (16.2) (69.3) (51.3) (17.2) (68.5)
All 5725 1326 7051 5655 1452 7107
(81.2) (18.8) (100.0) (79.6) (20.4) (100.0)
Note: The entries denote cell sizes, with percentages in parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Estimation results over a period of 5-quarter delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 5-quarter
delay delay delay delay delay delay
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.180*** -0.189*** -0.194*** -0.203*** -0.196*** -0.295***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.025) (0.081)
F test 42.24 47.14 52.22 49.79 59.29 13.42
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.028 0.842*** 1.144*** 0.988*** 0.924*** 0.858
(1.240) (0.220) (0.224) (0.183) (0.195) (0.588)
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.005 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.021** -0.003 0.007
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011)
No. observations 29,904 28,404 26,353 24,249 22,379 20,584
with Fixed Effects
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.095*** -0.114*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.114*** -0.251***
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.094)
F test 7.88 12.45 11.21 10.20 7.01 7.14
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.004 0.540* 0.639** 0.634** 0.583* 0.518
(1.466) (0.283) (0.296) (0.301) (0.308) (0.387)
No. observations 29,682 28,326 25,964 24,151 22,321 20,528
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.006 0.020 0.014 0.007 -0.019* -0.013
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
No. observations 29,904 28,404 26,353 24,249 22,379 20,584
1 Controls: age, age-square and past work experience of wives and husbands, number of
children (aged up to 5 and between 6-14) and number of other adults in the household.
2 Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at quarter-year level (***p<0.01,
**p<0.05, *p<0.1)
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Table 3.4: Estimation results for 2-quarter delay period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st St. IV OLS 1st St. IV OLS
Male sectors’ output -0.194*** -0.120***
(0.026) (0.036)
Husband’s job loss 1.144*** 0.031*** 0.639** 0.014
(0.224) (0.011) (0.296) (0.013)
Female sectors’ output -0.039 0.189*** 0.040* -0.050 0.054 0.020
(0.028) (0.040) (0.020) (0.041) (0.072) (0.021)
Time trend -0.009*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.009*** -0.006** -0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Age of wife -0.008 0.021** 0.023***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Age of wife squared -0.013 -0.033* -0.030*** -0.005 -0.013 -0.011
(0.012) (0.022) (0.005) (0.021) (0.028) (0.010)
Years of schooling of wife -0.002* 0.021** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.011) (0.009)
Wife’s work experience -0.000 0.001* 0.000** -0.001 0.002** 0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age of husband -0.028*** 0.003* 0.002** -0.026*** 0.008 0.013
(0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.018) (0.013)
Age of husband squared -0.020* 0.005* 0.004** -0.010 0.003 0.000
(0.012) (0.003) (0.002) (0.021) (0.009) (0.000)
Years of schooling of husband -0.003*** 0.002** 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Husband’s work experience -0.012*** 0.001* 0.000* -0.010** 0.001 0.000
(0.005) (0.001) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
No. children aged 0-5 -0.004 -0.013*** -0.008*** -0.002 -0.014* -0.013*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
No. children aged 6-14 0.003 -0.001 0.002* -0.009 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
No. other adults in the household 0.001 -0.010* -0.009* -0.006 -0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Constant 5.598*** 2.620*** 0.707*** 0.223
(1.014) (0.561) (0.318) (0.342)
Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 26,353 26,353 26,353 25,964 25,964 26,353
1 Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the quarter-year level
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
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Table 3.5: Heterogeneity in AWE
(including fixed effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No 1-quarter 2-quarter 3-quarter 4-quarter 5-quarter
delay delay delay delay delay delay
Aged 15-50 years
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.147*** -0.164*** -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.155*** -0.332**
(0.045) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.117)
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.106 0.613** 0.639** 0.662** 0.587* 0.387
(1.480) (0.308) (0.313) (0.321) (0.327) (0.354)
No. observations 23,046 22,028 20,182 18,701 17,276 15,875
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.022** 0.021 0.010 0.004 -0.016 -0.014
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
No. observations 23,267 22,105 20,475 18,796 17,330 15,927
Aged 51-64 years
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.086** -0.086* -0.093* -0.107** -0.109* -0.101
(0.042) (0.045) (0.052) (0.056) (0.065) (0.081)
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.490 1.536 0.570 -0.333 1.137 -0.694
(2.570) (2.905) (0.962) (0.557) (1.200) (2.104)
No. observations 6,636 6,298 5,782 5,450 5,045 4,653
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss 0.014 -0.021 0.033 0.035 -0.035 -0.038
(0.030) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.027)
No. observations 6,637 6,299 5,878 5,453 5,049 4,657
Educated below high-school
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.200*** -0.158*** -0.154*** -0.313***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.052) (0.104)
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 1.325 0.585** 0.640** 0.659** 0.641* 0.659
(1.853) (0.282) (0.286) (0.335) (0.359) (0.456)
No. observations 21,239 20,449 18,810 17,542 16,243 14,971
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.014 0.023 0.011 0.005 -0.015 -0.015
(0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
No. observations 21,320 20,487 19,052 17,598 16,275 14,998
Educated at high-school or above level
First Stage
Male sectors’ output -0.005 -0.061 -0.087 -0.095 -0.030 -0.242**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.050) (0.099)
IV estimation
Husband’s job loss 4.057 0.773 0.428 -0.493 0.887 -0.065
(3.807) (1.387) (0.974) (0.861) (1.332) (0.832)
No. observations 8,443 7,877 7,154 6,609 6,078 5,557
OLS estimation
Husband’s job loss -0.045 -0.009 0.027 0.022 -0.036* -0.004
(0.018) (0.025) (0.036) (0.029) (0.019) (0.016)
No. observations 8,584 7,917 7,301 6,651 6,104 5,586
1 Each column reports the coefficients of six separate regressions from different delay periods (same as those in Table
3.3) for restricted subsamples of couples: those aged 15-50 (top panel), those aged 51-64 (the second panel from the
top), those with low education (the second panel from the bottom), those with high education (bottom panel).
2 Controls: age, age-square and past work experience of wives and husbands, number of children (aged up to 5 and
between 6-14) and number of other adults in the household.
3 Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at quarter-year level (***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1)
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